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1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
2. See infra Part I.
3. See Leading Cases: Export Clause, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 196, 196 (1996) (“Not
every word of the Constitution has proven a wellspring of jurisprudence.”).
4. 517 U.S. 843, 863 (1996).
5. 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998).
6. Compare 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-7, at 842
(3d ed., 2000) (describing Export Clause as “[t]he more important of these limits in
Article I, § 9 is that imposed by the Export Clause”), with  Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 5-9, at 318 n.1  (2d ed., 1988) (relegating Export Clause to mention
in footnote); see also Claire R. Kelly & Daniela Amzel, Does the Commerce Clause
Eclipse the Export Clause?: Making Sense of United States v. United States Shoe Corp.,
84 Minn. L. Rev. 129 (1999). But see 1 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal
Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 1-14 (3d ed., 1999) (giving one paragraph in a
five-volume treatise on taxation to the Export Clause).
7. The taxing power is defined broadly: “The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. But the
taxing power is subject to limitations – the uniformity rule for duties, imposts, and
excises, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c l. 1; the apportionment rule for d irect taxes, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 4; and the Export Clause, U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 9, cl. 5.
8. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the
Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 1057, 1058-62 (2001) (discussing conventional
understanding of taxing power) [hereinafter Jensen, Taxing Power]; see also Erik M.
Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?,
97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334, 2345-50 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Apportionment]; Erik M.
Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. &
Pol. 687 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution].
As hard as it is to imagine today, the Export Clause – which provides
that “[n]o Tax or duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State”1 – was
an essential part of the Constitution. Without the protection the Export Clause
provided to exporting states, particularly in the South, the Constitutional
Convention would have imploded.2 Times change, however, and, by mid-
twentieth century, the Export Clause had become invisible to all but the
nerdiest of constitutional scholars. It had become, at best, a historical curiosity.
Now the Export Clause is making a comeback. Largely ignored for over
seventy years, at least in important litigation,3 the Clause was the subject of
Supreme Court decisions in 1996, United States v. International Business
Machines Corp.,4 and in 1998, United States v. United States Shoe Corp.,5 both
of which struck down levies on constitutional grounds. Those decisions made,
or should have made, people take notice: the Export Clause matters.6
The congressional taxing power is often described as plenary,7 and few
think the Constitution limits that power in any significant way.8 But the Export
Clause, included in the Article I, section 9 list of what Congress may not do, is
an apparently straightforward restriction on the taxing power. Yes, there can be
4 Florida Tax Review [Vol.6:1
9. The meaning of “export” wasn’t obvious to  all in the republic’s early years,
when many states maintained a sense of independence. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 1797,
ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, 528 (imposing tax on, among other things, “any note or bill of
lading for any goods or merchandise to be exported, if from one district to another
district of the United States, not being in the same State, ten cents; if to be exported to
any foreign port or place, twenty-five cents”) (emphasis added). But it’s now clear the
reference is “only to exportation to foreign countries,” United States v. Hvoslef, 237
U.S. 1, 13 (1915), not to transfers across state lines. Similarly, the term “imports” in the
Import-Export Clause [U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see infra note 95] means goods
from foreign nations, not goods from other states. See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123
(1868).
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
11. Id. at 179.
12. Id.
13. See infra  notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
questions about application: What’s a “tax or duty”? What’s an “article
exported”? What does it mean to say a tax is laid “on” an article? Nevertheless,
interpretational difficulties shouldn’t obscure the core principle: It’s not within
the power of Congress to lay a tax or duty on exported articles.9
That principle isn’t meaningless, as Chief Justice John Marshall
recognized in Marbury v. Madison.10 Marshall used the Export Clause as an
example in defense of the proposition that, “[i]n some cases . . ., the
constitution must be looked into by judges”11 – in defense, that is, of the idea
that judicial review is inherent in the constitutional structure:
It is declared that “no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any state.” Suppose a duty on the export of
cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover
it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the
judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the
law?12
Justice Marshall obviously thought those questions were no-brainers. And if the
judiciary is going to keep its eyes open, as the Marbury Court concluded it
must, Congress shouldn’t even try to impose such a prohibited duty.
So there’s something to the Export Clause, but a skeptic might still
question the value of reexamining the Clause in 2003. To be sure, the duties
hypothesized by Justice Marshall were important concerns in the late
eighteenth century, when the southern states were worried that, without a
prohibition on export duties, the new national government might try to cripple
the southern economies.13 But that was then and this is now. Perhaps the South
continues to feel itself under siege, but, if so, it’s not because of export
taxation. And even if we think the tax treatment of cotton, tobacco, and flour
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14. There’s no  reason to think that Marshall’s understanding of the Export
Clause was really so limited. His slam-dunk hypotheticals were used to  support the idea
of judicial review, not to provide a full explication of the Export Clause. He certainly
had a broader understanding of the Export Clause later in his career. See Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 W heat.) 419 (1827); infra notes 254-256 and  accompanying text.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (Tenth Amendment).
17. As I’ll discuss later, the Court said its analysis in both cases should be
limited to the Export Clause, but it’s not clear why that should be so. See infra notes
129-132 and 197-199 and accompanying text; Part III.C.
is of paramount national importance, what’s there to talk about? The analysis
of Justice Marshall’s hypotheticals is no more difficult now than it was at the
time of the founding. Of course Congress can’t tax such products if they’re in
the process of being exported. End of discussion.
All of which might make the Export Clause seem intellectually trivial,
but (surprise!) this article suggests that’s not the case. IBM and U.S. Shoe
reflected a far broader understanding of the Clause’s scope than Justice
Marshall’s hypotheticals would suggest,14 and the cases effectively revived a
body of case law developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
under the Export Clause.15 Furthermore, if those cases are taken seriously – and
they have to be, as the Court twice within a short period invalidated
congressional exercises of the taxing power – IBM and U.S. Shoe may evidence
renewed judicial interest in national taxation. In many other areas, the Supreme
Court has been showing less deference to Congress than had been true for
decades,16 and that may be happening with taxation as well. If so, that’s a
momentous change.17
This much can be said for certain: the Export Clause is a historically
important constitutional provision that modern courts are obligated to interpret
in a way that ensures its continuing vitality. That means, too, that Congress
should legislate with a better sense of the Export Clause than it has shown
recently.
To explicate the Export Clause, the article begins by describing the
founders’ understanding of the Clause: although not everyone at the
Constitutional Convention was happy with limitations on the national
government’s power to tax exports, the Export Clause was intended to be a
complete prohibition of export taxation, and the prohibition was intended to
have real bite. Application of the Clause to situations that go beyond Justice
Marshall’s hypotheticals isn’t at all straightforward, however, and Part II
discusses IBM and U.S. Shoe, which illustrate the inherent difficulties of the
Export Clause and the Supreme Court’s not always happy treatment of those
6 Florida Tax Review [Vol.6:1
18. The national government was limited to  requisitioning funds from the states,
without any enforcement mechanism, a procedure that worked poorly. See Erik M.
Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, The Tenth Amendment, and the Federal
Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 Const. Comment. 355
(1998).
19. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 8, at 1068-69.
20. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787),
reprinted in 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 286 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
difficulties. Part III considers a number of interpretational issues under the
Export Clause, derived from the pre-1924 cases that were effectively revived
by the Court’s decisions in IBM and U.S. Shoe. Finally, Part IV discusses the
role of the Export Clause today.
I. THE EXPORT CLAUSE AND THE FOUNDING
Treating the Export Clause as a serious limitation on the national taxing
power is perfectly consistent with original understanding. The Clause wasn’t
an afterthought at the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, it’s no overstatement
to suggest that, without the Clause, the delegates in Philadelphia would have
been unable to agree on the formation of a new national government.
Whether to permit the national government to tax exports occupied a
surprising amount of time and effort at the Constitutional Convention. Because
the Articles of Confederation hadn’t permitted the “national” government even
to levy import duties,18 any power given to the government to impose and
enforce taxes was going to represent a quantum leap in national authority. It
was generally agreed that the government should be able to tax imports – many
founders thought that would be the nation’s primary source of revenue in
ordinary times19 – but the debates about other forms of taxation, including taxes
on exports, were often contentious.
To many Federalists, exports were an appropriate subject of taxation.
The nation needed revenue, and exports were one obvious, readily available
source of funds. As reported in Madison’s notes, Alexander Hamilton argued
early at the Constitutional Convention, “Whence then is the national revenue
to be drawn? from Commerce, even [from] exports which notwithstanding the
common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, [from] excise, &c &c.
These tho’ not equal, are less unequal than quotas.”20 And taxes on exports
were thought to be relatively easy to administer, something stressed even by
some Anti-Federalists worried about how intrusive other forms of taxation
could be. Brutus, for example, thought a tax on exports and imports “should be
2003] The Export Clause 7
21. Essays of Brutus VII, N.Y. J. (Jan. 3, 1788), reprin ted in  2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 400, 404 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Brutus didn’t understand why
limits on export taxation were in the Constitution: “I cannot perceive the reason of the
restriction. It appears to me evident, that a tax on articles exported, would be as nearly
equal as any that we can expect to lay, and it certainly would be collected with more
ease and less expence than any direct tax.” Id. at 405.
22. The views of Madison and Washington weren’t enough, however, to  carry
the Virginia delegation, which voted against the power to tax exports. See infra text
accompanying note 63.
23. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 307 (Aug. 16, 1787).
24. 2 id. at 306 (Aug. 16, 1787). “Morris considered such a proviso [restricting
export taxation] as inadmissible  any where. It was so  radically objectionable, that it
might cost the whole system the support of some members.” 2 id.
25. See infra text accompanying note 63.
26. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 306 (Aug. 16, 1787).
raised by simple laws, with few officers, with certainty and expedition, and
with the least interferences with the internal police of the states.”21
Three of the most significant participants at the Constitutional
Convention, Gouverneur Morris (representing Pennsylvania), James Wilson
(also Pennsylvania), and James Madison (of Virginia), spoke in favor of a
national power to tax exports, as did many others, and the largely silent, but
influential, George Washington supported such a power.22 Morris thought the
power to tax exports was essential: “Taxes on exports are a necessary source
of revenue. For a long time the people of America will not have money to pay
direct taxes. Seize and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.”23
Although most founders focused on taxing imports as the easiest way to fund
the new government, Morris emphasized “that it would not in some cases be
equitable to tax imports without taxing exports; and that taxes on exports would
be often the most easy and proper of the two.”24
His state, Virginia, wound up opposing export taxation, as did all of the
southern states,25 but Madison agreed with Morris, arguing both in favor of a
national power to tax exports and against state power to do so:
1. the power of taxing exports is proper in itself, and as the
States cannot with propriety exercise it separately, it ought to
be vested in them collectively. 2. it might with particular
advantage be exercised with regard to articles in which
America was not rivalled in foreign markets, as Tobo. &c.  . .
[T]he price would be thereby raised in America, and
consequently the taxes be paid by the European Consumer. 3.
it would be unjust to the States whose produce was exported
by their neighbours, to leave it subject to be taxed by the
latter.26
8 Florida Tax Review [Vol.6:1
27. 2 id. at 307. T his argument was common. See, e.g. Statement of John
Dickenson of Delaware (Aug. 21 , 1787), 2 id . at 361 . (“The power of taxing exports
may be inconvenient at present; but it must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit it
with respect to all articles and for ever. He thought it would be better to except
particular articles from the power.”); Statement of Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania
(Aug. 21, 1787), 2 id. at 362 (noting he “would be agst. a tax on exports to be laid
immediately; but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper time may call
for it – This would certainly be the case when America should become a manufacturing
country.”); Statement of James Madison (Aug. 21, 1787), 2 id. at 361. (“As we ought
to be governed by national and permanent views, it is a sufficient argument for giving
ye power over exports that a tax, tho’ it may not be expedient at present, may be so
hereafter.”) (footnote omitted).
28. 2 id. at 307 (Aug. 16, 1787).
29. 2 id. at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787).
30. 2 id.
31. 2 id. at 306 (Aug. 16, 1787); see also 2 id. at 360 (Aug. 21, 1787) (“Mr.
Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports; as unjust and alarming to the
staple States.”).
32. See James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New
Constitution, Recommended by the Late Convention (1788), reprin ted in  Pamphlets on
the Constitution of the United States 333, 367 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo  press
1968) (1888) [hereinafter Ford] (“Congress itself are prohibited from laying duties on
exports, because by that means those States which have a great deal of produce to export
would be taxed much more heavily than those which had little or nothing for
exportation.”).
And, emphasized Madison, the United States needed to have available the
power to tax exports in the future, even if it didn’t do so now: “we are not
providing for the present moment only.”27
Wilson, too, “was decidedly agst prohibiting general taxes on
exports.”28 Echoing Madison, he noted that granting the power didn’t mean it
would always be used: “[T]he power had been attacked by reasoning which
could only have held good in case the Genl Govt. had been compelled, instead
of authorized, to lay duties on exports.”29 But the power needed to be available:
“To deny [it] is to take from the Common Govt. half the regulation of trade.”30
Taxing exports was nevertheless a touchy subject. The strongest
support for prohibition came from southern delegates, who feared that a tax on
exports could be used to the South’s detriment. In the late eighteenth century,
it was the South that was the primary exporter of goods, largely textiles,
tobacco, and related products. The southern states were, George Mason of
Virginia proudly said, the “staple States.”31 A general tax on exports would
therefore hit the South hardest,32 and, even if that weren’t so, many of the
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33. However, it wasn’t only southern delegates worried about export taxation’s
potential for destroying the union through targeted duties. Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts, who became an Anti-Federalist, “thought the legislature could not be
trusted with such a power. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially,
raising one and depressing another part of it.” 2 Farrand, supra note , at 307 (Aug. 16,
1787); see also 2 id. at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (noting Gerry’s fear that “power over ex-
ports . . . might be made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the Genl
Government, and to grant it any new powers which might be demanded”); cf. 2 Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Sta tes § 1011, at 469-70 (Da
Capo Press 1970) (1833):
The obvious object of these provisions is, to prevent any possibility
of applying the power to lay taxes, or regulate commerce, injuriously
to the interests of any one state, so as to favour or aid another. If
congress were allowed to lay a duty on exports from any one state it
might unreasonably injure, or even destroy, the staple productions, or
common articles of that state. The inequality of such a tax would be
extreme. In some of the states, the whole of their means result from
agricultural exports. In others, a great portion is derived from other
sources; from external fisheries; from freights; and from the profits
of commerce in its largest extent. The burthen of such a tax would, of
course, be very unequally distributed. The power is, therefore, wholly
taken away to intermeddle with the subject of exports.
Justice Story’s reference to “these provisions” was to the Export Clause and the
provisions following it in Article I, Section 9, generally preventing Congress from
favoring one port over another, or requiring vessels bound to or from one state from
being subject to regulation or taxation in another state.
34. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 362-63 (Aug. 21, 1787).
southern delegates were afraid northern states would gang up against the South
to enact targeted duties.33 Mason put the concern this way:
“[A] majority when interested will oppress the minority”. . . .
If we compare the States in this point of view the 8 Northern
States have an interest different from the five Southn. States,
– and have in one branch of the legislature 36 votes agst 29.
and in the other, in the proportion of 8 agst 5. The Southern
States had therefore good ground for their suspicions. The case
of Exports was not the same with that of imports. The latter
were the same throughout the States: the former very
different.34
A related argument, with a more neutral ring, was that taxing exports
would punish industrious behavior. The states producing the most for
exportation, whether they were in the North or the South, would obviously be
10 Florida Tax Review [Vol.6:1
35. James McHenry, before the Maryland House of Delegates, made the
following argument:
That no Duties shall be laid on Exports or Tonage, on Vessells bound
from one State to another is the effect of that attention to general
Equality that governed the deliberations of [the] Convention. Hence
unproductive States cannot draw a revenue from productive States
into the Public Treasury, nor unproductive States be hampered in
their Manufactures to the emolument of others.
3 Farrand, supra note 20, at 149 (Nov. 29, 1787).
36. See, e .g., 2 id. at 359-60 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut) (arguing that export tax “will discourage industry, as taxes on imports
discourage luxury”). Founders sensitive to economic forces noted other unhappy effects
as well. John Francis Mercer of Maryland worried that taxes on exports would
“encourag[e] the raising of articles not meant for exportation.” 2 id. at 307 (Aug. 16,
1787).
37. 2 id. at 305. Mason’s concern that the South might be picked on went far
beyond this point. Despite prevailing on the prohibition of export taxation, he opposed
the Constitution. See The Objections of the Hon. George Mason, to the Proposed
Fœderal Constitution. Addressed to the Citizens of Virginia, reprin ted in  Ford, supra
note 32, at 327, 331 (“By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and
navigation laws, the five southern states (whose produce and circumstances are totally
different from those of the eight northern and eastern states) will be ruined”).
38. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 359-60 (Aug. 21, 1787). Justice Story
explained the practicalities: “Upon the whole, the wisdom and sound policy of this
restriction cannot admit of reasonable doubt; not so much that the powers of the general
government were likely to be abused, as that the constitutional prohibition would allay
jealousies, and confirm confidence.” 2 Story, supra note 33, § 1012, at 471.
burdened most by export taxation,35 and it would be crazy for the nation to
create a disincentive to productivity.36
Finally, southern opponents of export taxation argued, quite
reasonably, that northerners in 1787 might see southern exportation as a source
of immediate revenue, but the respective interests of the sections could shift
over time: You northerners make it possible to tax exports now, thinking that
it’s the South that will pay, and you could be sorry. Your section of the country
may be hit later. George Mason “hoped the Northn. States did not mean to deny
the Southern this security [of prohibiting taxes on exports]. It would hereafter
be as desirable to the former when the latter should become the most
populous.”37 The argument that, in the long run, the North might suffer helped
stiffen the resistance of a few northern delegates already worried that, as Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut put it, “the taxing of exports would engender
incurable jealousies.”38
None of those concerns was frivolous, and something else was at stake
as well. Although some of the arguments against export taxation were phrased
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39. I’ve argued that another limitation on the taxing power, the apportionment
rule for direct taxes, wasn’t pro-slavery and therefore shouldn’t be treated as
irredeemably tainted. See Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution, supra note 8, at 702-06;
Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 8, at 2358. Because of this argument, I was
outrageously accused of being indifferent to the “legacy of racism.” See Bruce
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 30 n.112 (1999). If one
is looking for constitutional provisions to trash because of slavery, the Export Clause
strikes me as a much better candidate than the apportionment rule.
40. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
41. 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 592 (July 12, 1787).
42. 1 id.
43. 1 id. (footnote omitted). As a good southerner, Pinckney of course wanted
slaves counted in full for this purpose. See 1 id. at 580 (July 11, 1787) (“Genl. Pinckney
insisted that blacks be included in the rule of Representation, equally with the Whites”)
(footnote omitted).
in sectionally neutral terms, it was clearly the South that was most concerned
about export taxation. A critical issue to the South was the effect of taxes on the
“peculiar institution”: duties directed at agricultural exports could be used to
strike indirectly at slavery. If southern agriculture were seriously harmed by
excessive taxation, slavery itself could be in jeopardy. Taxing exports would
have been an emotional subject in any event, but with the slavery connection
it became a potentially convention-busting issue.39
When apportioning taxation among the states on the basis of population
was first seriously addressed at the Constitutional Convention, on July 12,
1787, Gouverneur Morris suggested that apportionment ought to be limited to
direct taxation (as is now the case):40 “Notwithstanding what had been said to
the contrary he was persuaded that the imports & consumption were pretty
nearly equal throughout the Union,”41 and apportionment was therefore
unnecessary to make sure taxes on items of consumption didn’t result in
sectional abuse. Accordingly, he said, “[w]ith regard to indirect taxes on
exports & imports & on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable.”42
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina agreed that it made
sense to limit apportionment to direct taxation, but part of what Morris had said
scared him:
He was alarmed at what was said yesterday, concerning the
Negroes [how slaves should be counted in determining a
state’s representation in the House of Representatives].43 He
was now again alarmed at what had been thrown out
concerning the taxing of exports. S. Carola. has in one year
exported to the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which was the
fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in
proportion to this amount? She will not. Neither ought she
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44. 1 id. at 592 (July 12, 1787).
45. 2 id. at 95 (July 23, 1787).
46. See also 2 id. at 374 (statement of Pierce Butler of South Carolina) (Aug.
22, 1787) (“Mr. Butler declared that he never would agree to the power of taxing
exports.”).
47. See Letter from James Mad ison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787),
reprinted in 10 The Papers of James Madison 214 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977):
Some contended for an unlimited power over trade including exports
as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other imports; some for
such a power, provided the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses
were required; Some for such a qualification of the power, with an
exemption of exports and slaves, others for an exemption of exports
only. The result is seen in the Constitution. S. Caro lina & Georgia
were inflexible on the point of the slaves.
48. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 129, 168-69.
49. 2 id. at 307 (Aug. 16, 1787).
then to be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a clause would be
inserted in the system restraining the Legislature from a taxing
Exports.44
A couple of weeks later, General Pinckney emphasized how important
the connection between slavery and exportation was. He “reminded the
Convention that if the Committee [of Detail] should fail to insert some security
to the Southern States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he
shd. be bound by duty to his State to vote agst. their Report.”45 This was no idle
threat.46 What was at stake in the debates on export taxation was whether the
thirteen colonies would be able to agree on a Constitution at all: South Carolina
and Georgia in particular were unwilling to compromise.47 That’s why the draft
prepared by the Committee of Detail provided the security Pinckney demanded:
“No Tax or Duty shall be laid by the Legislature, on Articles exported from any
State.”48
Gouverneur Morris wasn’t convinced that there was anything
especially dangerous in the power to tax exports. Skeptics could find something
to worry about with any power granted to the new national government:
“However the legislative power may be formed, it will if disposed be able to
ruin the Country.”49 But, in Morris’s view, such doomsday concerns shouldn’t
shut down the process of creating a Constitution. Of course, the delegates
should do what they could to minimize risks, but, unless the national
government was to be powerless — unless, that is, there was going to be no
nation — the risks couldn’t be eliminated. Morris thought “local considerations
2003] The Export Clause 13
50. 2 id. at 360 (Aug. 21, 1787). Morris was responding to Hugh Williamson
of North Carolina, who had said, “Tho’ N – C. has been taxed by Virga by a duty on
12,000 Hhs of her Tobo. exported thro’ Virga yet he would never agree to this power.
Should it take place, it would destroy the last hope of an adoption of the plan.” 2 id.
51.
If no tax can be laid on exports, an embargo cannot be laid, though in
time of war such a measure may be of critical importance – Tobacco,
lumber, and live-stock are three objects belonging to different States,
of which great advantage might be maed [sic] by a power to tax
exports – To these may be added Ginseng and M asts for Ships by
which a tax might be thrown on other nations. . . . The State of the
Country also, will change, and render duties on exports, as skins,
beaver & other peculiar raw materials, politic in the view of
encouraging American Manufactures.
2 id. Morris’s hyperbole – if we can’t tax exports, we can’t impose an embargo – wasn’t
generally accepted . Madison also used the need to be able to impose embargos to justify
export taxation, but “M r. Elseworth [O liver Ellsworth of Connecticut] did not conceive
an embargo by the Congress interdicted by this section [prohibiting export taxation].”
2 id. at 361 (Aug. 21, 1787). In addition,“Mr. McHenry [of Maryland] conceived that
power to be included in the power of war.” 2 id. at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787).
52. 2 id. at 361 (Aug. 21, 1787).
53. 2 id. at 306-07 (Aug. 16, 1787).
ought not to impede the general interest,”50 and he saw that happening with a
short-sighted focus on exports.51
To try to soften the resistance of his fellow southerners, Madison
played down the importance of sectional effects on export taxation, taking a
number of not entirely consistent positions. At one point, he argued that the
feared negative effects on the South were overblown:
As to the fear of disproportionate burdens on the more
exporting States, it might be remarked that it was agreed on all
hands that the revenue wd. principally be drawn from trade,
and as only a given revenue would be needed, it was not
material whether all should be drawn wholly from imports –
or half from those, and half from exports – The imports and
exports must be pretty nearly equal in every State – and
relatively the same among the different States.52
At another time he suggested that there might be a case for the South’s initially
bearing a disproportionate part of the burden: “The Southn. States being most
in danger and most needing naval protection, could the less complain if the
burden should be somewhat heaviest on them.”53 And he tried to turn George
Mason’s your-turn-will-come argument, used to scare northern delegates about
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54. See supra note 37 and  accompanying text.
55. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 307 (Aug. 16, 1787).
56. 2 id. at 308 (Aug. 16, 1787); see also 2 id. at 363 (Aug. 21, 1787).
Mr Clymer of Pennsylvania remarked that every State might
reason with regard to  its particular productions, in the same manner
as the Southern States. The middle States may apprehend an
oppression of their wheat flour, provisions, &c. and with more
reason, as these articles were exposed to a competition in foreign
markets not incident to Tobo. rice &c – T hey may apprehend  also
combinations agst. them between the Eastern & Southern States as
much as the latter  can apprehend them between the Eastern &  middle
. . . .
57. 2 id. at 361 (Aug. 21, 1787).
58. 2 id. at 308 (Aug. 16, 1787).
59. 2 id. at 363 (Aug. 21, 1787).
what export taxation could eventually bring to their part of the country,54 into
something that might placate the South: “time will equalize the situation of the
States in this matter.”55
But, even if they’d been internally consistent, assurances of this sort
could go only so far. Whatever Morris and Madison thought, the parade of
horribles was marching through the Constitutional Convention. The fears were
real, whether or not well-founded, and piecemeal solutions were unlikely to
work. Trying to craft a provision that would have protected against sectional
taxation or that would have carved out specified categories of exported
products from the taxing power could have tied up the Constitutional
Convention for weeks, with no guarantee of success: “To examine and compare
the States in relation to imports and exports will be opening a boundless field,”
said Roger Sherman of Connecticut.56 To end the bickering, Sherman argued,
“It is best to prohibit the National legislature in all cases. The States will never
give up all power over trade. An enumeration of particular articles would be
difficult invidious and improper.”57 The alternative to prohibiting export
taxation – particularly with the slavery subtext in the debates – was no
constitution at all: “A power to tax exports would shipwreck the whole.”58
Further evidence that the prohibition was intended to be total can be
found in the unsuccessful attempts to amend the draft Export Clause, to
preserve some role for national taxation of exports. For example, George
Clymer of Pennsylvania thought export taxation should be permitted as long as
it was being done for regulation of trade, but not otherwise. He therefore
recommended “inserting after the word ‘duty’ [in the draft language of the
Export Clause] the words ‘for the purpose of revenue,’”59 thus precluding
export taxation that had as its only purpose raising revenue. I don’t see how
such a purpose-based test could be applied in practice, and Clymer’s motion
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60. That’s the lesson the Supreme Court drew from this experience. See
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 292-93 (1901); infra note 83.
61. 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 363 (Aug. 21, 1787). The Madison motion
followed a suggestion by John Langdon of New Hampshire that if it’s “feared that the
Northern States will oppress the trade of the Southn[,] [t]his may be guarded agst by
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 or 3/4  of the legislature in such cases.” 2 id. at 359
(Aug. 21, 1787).
62. 2 id. at 363 (Aug. 21, 1787).
63. 2 id. at 363-64.
64. 2 id. at 374 (Aug. 22, 1787).
65. But see supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting Brutus’s support for
export taxation).
was rejected, suggesting that the founders considered a tax’s purpose to be
irrelevant under the Export Clause.60
A more significant effort at amendment was an attempt, in late August
of 1787, to add a supermajority requirement, which, it was hoped, would
protect sectional interests in the ordinary course, but would make it possible for
the national government to tax exports in extraordinary circumstances. Madison
moved, with a second by James Wilson, “to require 2/3 of each House to tax
exports – as a lesser evil than a total prohibition.”61 But, as Madison put it, “ it
passed in the Negative.”62 Five states voted “Yes” (New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) and six voted “No”
(Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia). Virginia’s vote reflected a division in the delegation: George
Washington joined Madison in the affirmative, but Mason, Edmund Randolph,
and John Blair voted No. After that, the total prohibition passed 7-4 (with
Massachusetts joining the six “No” votes on the Madison resolution),63 and a
later attempt by Gouverneur Morris and others to recommit the issue, with the
hope that “the clauses relating to taxes on exports & to a navigation act . . . may
form a bargain among the Northern & Southern States,”64 also failed.
During the ratification period, there was relatively little public
discussion of the merits of the Export Clause, and that shouldn’t be surprising.
Anti-Federalists concerned about the national taxing power had no reason to
criticize a provision that was a limitation on that power. The Export Clause
might not have gone far enough for most Anti-Federalists, but it wasn’t a
negative.65 For supporters of the Constitution, criticizing the Export Clause
would have been counterproductive. Although people like Governeur Morris,
James Wilson, and James Madison favored a national power to tax exports, a
Constitution with an Export Clause was better than no Constitution at all.
Besides, since it was necessary for political reasons to stress limits on the
national taxing power – any serious, public suggestion that the power was
boundless would have been fatal to ratification – the Export Clause was likely
to be praised even by those who wished it weren’t there.
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66. See supra note 12 and  accompanying text.
67. When I use the term “direct” or “directly” in this context, I don’t intend to
raise the specter of direct taxation, which is subject to its own special rules (generally
requiring apportionment among the states on the basis of respective populations). U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see generally Jensen, Apportionment,
supra note 8 . Instead I refer to taxes that are levied on the goods themselves, rather than
on, say, associated insurance or on bills of lading attached to the goods.
68. Oh sure, there must be a postmodernist out there who could find fatal
ambiguity on this point, but I’m not aware of anyone’s trying to  do that . . . yet.
69. That’s not entirely true. There was brief discussion about whether the
Export Clause would prohibit an embargo , suggesting that at least some delegates
thought the scope of the Export Clause was very broad. See supra note 51.
70. The dissenters in United States v. International Business Machines Corp .
came close to taking that position, with Justice Kennedy emphasizing that “specific taxes
on exported goods were the only taxes mentioned . . . at the Constitutional Convention.”
517 U.S. 843, 873 (1996); see infra note 92; note 90 (accepting only grudgingly a
broader conception of the Export Clause).
71. For most readers, this turns the usual assumption on its head – i.e., that
Congress can impose a tax unless there is a clearly applicable limitation. But the
anything-goes-unless-specifically-prohibited perspective ignores the founders’ legitimate
fears of concentrated power. The Constitution made possible many forms of national
taxation that hadn’t been available under the Articles of Confederation – in that respect
it was a pro-tax document – but the taxing power was still to be constrained. I’ve argued
elsewhere that the way to interpret taxing provisions in the Constitution, if one cares
about being consistent with original understanding, is to require strict conformity with
II. IBM AND U.S. SHOE: 
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT AND THE EXPORT CLAUSE
To this point, I’ve argued that, at the time of the nation’s founding,
proponents and detractors agreed that the Export Clause was a serious
limitation on congressional power; indeed, that’s why the Clause was such a
controversial subject. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention discussed
taxes and duties that might be levied directly on exports – like those
hypothesized by Justice Marshall in Marbury66 – and concluded, to the dismay
of some, that a complete prohibition on such taxation was necessary.67
The founders clearly intended to prohibit a levy that takes the form
“one cent per pound of flour exported.” On that point, everyone agrees.68 And,
because the delegates discussed only the easy cases,69 it’s possible to see the
Export Clause as doing nothing more than that.70 But things can’t be that
simple. We know the Clause was meant to have real effect, and limiting its
application to the most straightforward cases (thereby making it easy for
Congress to draft around the limitation) would gut the Export Clause. If the
purposes of the Clause are to be effectuated, it has to have greater scope than
the founding debates intimated.71
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the rules. If there’s doubt about constitutionality, it should be resolved against the
statute. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 8, at 2414-19; infra Parts III.B.4 & IV.
72. See infra Part III.B.
73. The last case heard was A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66
(1923). See infra  notes 314-24 and  accompanying text.
74. Coherence would require that Export Clause jurisprudence not only make
sense on its own terms, but also that the understanding of the Export Clause fit with the
Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause. But since relatively few cases have
required courts to try to square the various clauses, the jurisprudence of each clause has
gone off in its own direction. As a result, it’s become more and more difficult to fit the
pieces together. See infra Part III.C.1.
75. See, e .g., Ackerman, supra note 39, at 3 (“[T]here are no significant limits
on the national governments’s taxing, spending, and regulatory powers where the
economy is concerned–other than the requirement that government compensate owners
if their property is taken for public purposes.”).
76. 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
77. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
Over the years, the judiciary struggled to give content to the Export
Clause, to ensure that the purposes of the Export Clause were carried out. The
Supreme Court evaluated quite a few levies under the Export Clause between
1876 and 1923, rejecting several,72 and then the Court seemed to give up. From
1923 until 1996 it heard no Export Clause cases.73 Perhaps the Court found the
cases too boring (they often are); perhaps the Court despaired of developing
any coherent understanding of the Export Clause (a good reason for
despondency);74 or perhaps the Court simply decided, as have most academic
commentators, that taxation is an area in which Congress can do what it
wants.75 Whatever the reasons for the judicial work stoppage, it ended with U.S.
v. International Business Machines Corp.76 and United States v. United States
Shoe Corp.,77 decided in 1996 and 1998, respectively.
These cases didn’t involve sexy topics – a tax on premiums paid to
foreign insurers (IBM) and a tax levied to fund harbor maintenance (U.S. Shoe)
– and they didn’t make the front pages. As is often true, however, cases that
don’t lend themselves to cocktail chitchat may turn out to be the most
important. For decades the Supreme Court had left Congress to determine the
limits of its own power in taxation. But in both IBM and U.S. Shoe, the Court
invoked the Constitution to reject the application of tax statutes. If nothing else,
the cases demonstrate that the Export Clause can’t be as simple as the Marshall
hypotheticals suggest and that the judiciary once again has a role to play in
evaluating the legitimacy of Internal Revenue Code provisions.
A. IBM
Even though, in 1996, the Supreme Court was looking at the Export
Clause for the first time since 1923, the Court managed to dodge almost all the
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78. 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
79. 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
80. IBM, 517 U.S. at 845.
81. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg dissented; Justice Stevens didn’t
participate. Id. at 844.
82. Id. at 861; see also id . at 852  (noting that “text . . . expressly prohibits
Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports”); id. at 859-60 (“While the original
impetus may have had a narrow focus, the remedial provision that ultimately became the
Export Clause does not . . . .”); 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 220 (quoting Rufus King of
Massachusetts to the effect that “[i]n two great points the hands of the Legislature were
important interpretational issues in U.S. v. IBM.78 For those who think the Court
should be providing detailed guidance about the meaning of constitutional
provisions, IBM was an exercise in frustration, as I’ll demonstrate below.
Frustrating though it was, the case does force us to confront some basic
issues in interpreting the Export Clause. In the following pages, I’ll use IBM as
a basis for discussing the nature and purpose of the Export Clause, the
significance of early revenue acts in interpreting the Export Clause, and the
coherence of the 1915 precedent, Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v.
United States,79 on which the IBM Court relied. Although the Court followed
Thames & Mersey in a mindless way, I’ll argue that the old case actually had
some merit and that IBM therefore came to a defensible result. 
1. The Purpose and Scope of the Export Clause – In IBM, the Court
struck down what Justice Thomas called, in the opening paragraph of his
opinion for the Court, a “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on
goods in export transit.”80 With the case characterized in that way by six
justices,81 IBM reinforced the principle that the Export Clause is an absolute
prohibition: a tax or duty can be forbidden by the Export Clause even if
Congress doesn’t single out exports, or a subset of exports, for discriminatory
treatment. Relying on one of the Export Clause’s original purposes, to prevent
taxation directed at the southern states, the government had argued that the tax
was constitutional precisely because it didn’t discriminate against exports. By
its terms, however, the Export Clause has broader sweep, as the Court
explained:
The Government’s policy argument – that the Framers
intended the Export Clause to narrowly alleviate the fear of
northern repression through taxation of southern exports by
prohibiting only discriminatory taxes – cannot be squared with
the broad language of the Export Clause. The better reading,
that adopted by our earlier cases, is that the Framers sought to
alleviate their concerns by completely denying to Congress the
power to tax exports at all.82
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absolutely tied. [T]he importation of slaves could not be prohibited – exports could not
be taxed.”) (Aug. 8, 1787).
83. In Fairbank v. United States, the Court wrote, “The requirement of the
Constitution is that exports should be free from any governmental burden. The language
is ‘no tax or duty.’” 181 U.S. 283, 290 (1901). “[T]he purpose of the restriction is that
exportation – all exportation – shall be free from national burden.” Id. at 292. The Court
gave as evidence the Constitutional Convention’s rejection of a motion that the “power
of taxing Exports . . . should be restrained to regulations of trade, <by inserting after the
word ‘duty’ the words> ‘for the purpose of revenue.’” 2 Farrand, supra note 20, at 363
(Aug. 21, 1787) (citation omitted); see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. The
inference is that the founders in tended to prohibit taxing exports regardless of the
purpose behind a tax. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292.
The levy at issue in Fairbank did discriminate against exports, but in other
cases the Court used the Export Clause to strike down nondiscriminatory taxes. See, e.g.,
A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1923); Thames & Mersey
Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1915); United States v. Hvoslef,
237 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1915).
84. The government had argued  that developments in interpreting the Import-
Export Clause, see infra  note 95, had invalidated the old authority on the discrimination
issue. The Court responded in two ways. First, it seemed altogether to reject the
relevance of Import-Export Clause jurisprudence to this analysis. The “textual
command” of the Export Clause is absolute, without a hint that lack of discrimination
matters. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. In the alternative, however,
Justice Thomas also suggested that the government had failed to convince the Court that
a state’s nondiscriminatory levy on exports would be acceptable under the Import-
Export Clause. See infra note 132.
85. IRC § 4371(1). The tax applies to premiums paid  to insurers not subject to
U.S. income taxation. See IRC § 4372  (defining “foreign insurer”).
The first codification of American revenue statutes, the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, had provided for taxation of premiums on some limited categories of insurance
issued by foreign insurers, including insurance of “property within the United States .
. . against peril by sea or on inland waters,” Revenue Act of 1939, § 1804, 53 Stat. 1,
197 -98, which applied both to premiums on export insurance (“peril by sea”) and
premiums on inland transfers. In 1942, the  stamp tax was extended to apply to
“insurance policies of all kinds” issued by such insurers. H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333, at 61
(1942); see Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, §  502, 56 Stat. 798, 955-56
That is, it was because of the fear of discrimination that a prohibition on all
export taxation was deemed necessary in the Constitution, and that’s the way
earlier cases had interpreted the Export Clause.83
So far, so good.84 The rest of Justice Thomas’s statement of the case,
however, assumed the conclusion. He characterized the tax as being “on goods
in export transport,” which, if true, clearly brought the Export Clause into play.
But whether the tax was really on exported articles should have been a key
issue, not a given. In form, the tax was an excise on premiums paid to certain
foreign insurers (four cents per dollar of premium),85 not a tax laid directly on
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(amending Code section 1804). The change was intended partly to raise revenue for the
war and partly to “eliminate an unwarranted competitive advantage” for foreign insurers.
H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333, supra, at 61. So far as I can tell, the enactment of the 1939 Code
and the amendment in 1942 were made without any consideration of Export Clause
problems.
86. As the dissent noted, “The statute does not discriminate against exports.
Indeed, it does not even mention them.” IBM, 517 U.S. at 864  (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. When IBM shipped products to a foreign subsidiary, the sub often placed
insurance on the shipment with a foreign insurer. Id. at 845.
88. See id. at 863-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In so reformulating the
question, the Court makes the assumption that [the] insurance tax is a tax on export
goods, thereby adopting the premise . . . that I had thought we were to address.”).
89. See supra text accompanying note 12.
90. The IBM dissenters seemed to accept this point:
The protections of the Export Clause must extend , perhaps,
somewhat beyond specific taxes on goods, for “[I]f it meant no more
than that, the obstructions to exportation which it was the purpose to
prevent could readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming
to the constitutional restriction but in effect overriding it.” 
IBM, 517 U.S. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting United States
v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 13 (1915)). With “must” and “perhaps” juxtaposed in that way,
however, the acceptance was grudging at best. See also infra note 92 (noting Kennedy’s
emphasis on “specific taxes” in founding debates). 
91. See infra notes 96-97, 106, and 259-70 and accompanying text (describing
taxes on bills of lading imposed in 1797, 1862, and 1898).
92. In arguing for a limited role for the Export Clause, Justice Kennedy
correctly noted that “specific taxes on exported goods were the only taxes mentioned in
the debate at the Constitutional Convention,” IBM, 517 U.S. at 873 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting), but the founding generation wasn’t oblivious to substance-over-form
exported articles.86 IBM challenged the levy as it applied to insurance on
exports,87 but it’s not obvious that the Export Clause has anything to do with
such a levy. Simply calling the insurance tax a duty “on goods in export
transport,” as Justice Thomas did, seemed to leave nothing for the Court to
decide.88
It had been clear for over a century that a tax can implicate the Export
Clause even if not levied on exported articles as straightforwardly as the duties
hypothesized in Marbury v. Madison.89 If the Export Clause prohibited nothing
but taxes imposed directly on goods, it would be easy to circumvent. Instead of
taxing an exported article, for example, Congress might impose a tax on the
paperwork attached to the article.90 (Congress tried to do just that several times
in the nation’s history.91) The founders didn’t discuss such possibilities in their
deliberations on the Export Clause, but it’s hard to imagine they would have
been indifferent to obvious attempts to sidestep constitutional rules.92
2003] The Export Clause 21
matters. Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445
(1827), raised a substance-over-form hypothetical involving the Export Clause – a hypo
that he thought had a clear answer. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, Congress in 1797 enacted a stamp tax that appears to  have been, at least
in part, an attempt to circumvent the Export Clause. The 1797 stamp tax was valid only
if the Export Clause  was understood in the most formalistic way possible, to apply only
to “specific taxes on exported goods.” See infra Part II.A.2.
93. For what it’s worth, Congress didn’t seem to  have bad motives in enacting
the modern version of the tax on insurance premiums. See supra note 85. But it also
didn’t go out of its way to address the constitutional problems raised in an earlier
Supreme Court decision. See infra note 119.
94. IBM, 517 U.S. at 864 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and
all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the
Congress.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
The critical question in a case like IBM therefore ought to be how close
a connection between tax and exported good is needed before there’s an Export
Clause problem. At one level everything’s connected to everything else, of
course – we hear that proposition often in popular discourse – but that principle
shouldn’t convert every levy into a constitutional issue. The IBM Court could
have concluded that the tax on insurance premiums was a tax on an ancillary
service, insurance, rather than on the exported articles – not close enough, that
is, to bring the Export Clause into play.93 And dissenting Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg thought that was how the case should have been decided. Because the
tax on premiums “taxes a service distinct from the goods and is not a proxy for
taxing the goods,” Kennedy wrote, “it does not fall within the prohibition of the
Export Clause.”94
2. Eighteenth Century Legislation as an Indication of Original
Understanding – The test enunciated by the dissenters – looking to whether the
tax reached “a service distinct from the goods and [was] not a proxy for taxing
the goods” – was derived from late twentieth-century cases interpreting the
Import-Export Clause (which, among other things, limits state taxation of
exports95). I’ll turn to the merits of that position in a moment, but I first want
to consider, and reject, the proposition that early congressional practice proves
the constitutional validity of a tax on export insurance.
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96. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, 527.
97. The tax rate had been changed by the Act of Feb. 28, 1799 , ch. 17, 1 Stat.
622, and repeal came with the Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148. Henry Carter
Adams, Taxation in the United States 1789-1816, at 57 (1884) (“[U]pon the accession
of Jefferson to the P residency, it was endeavored to change radically the financial policy
of the United States. . . . [I]n 1802 , all internal and direct taxes were abolished . . . .”).
A similar levy was enacted during the Civil War. See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12
Stat. 432, continued by Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 291, repealed by Act
of June 6, 1872, ch. 315, 17  Stat. 230, 256. See Randolph E. Paul, Taxation in the
United States 6 (1954).
98. 181 U.S. 283 (1901); see infra notes 258-66 and  accompanying text.
99. IBM, 517 U.S. at 875 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900) finding support in 1797 Act, which included a legacy tax, for
congressional power to enact unapportioned estate tax); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160, 171 (1948) (“The [Alien Enemy Act of 1798] is almost as old as the Constitution,
and it would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the statute offensive to some
emanation of the Bill of Rights.”).
 In IBM, dissenting Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg pointed to an early
revenue act, enacted by the Fifth Congress, in support of just that proposition.
Congress in 1797 approved “An Act laying Duties on stamped Vellum,
Parchment and Paper,” titled to suggest that duties were being laid on legal
documents, like bills of lading, rather than on goods. The 1797 Act included a
stamp duty on
any policy of insurance or instrument in nature thereof,
whereby any ships, vessels or goods going from one district to
another in the United States, or from the United States to any
foreign port or place, shall be insured, to wit, if going from
one district to another in the United States, twenty-five cents;
if going from the United States to any foreign port or place,
when the sum for which insurance is made shall not exceed
five hundred dollars, twenty-five cents; and when the sum
insured shall exceed five hundred dollars, one dollar.96
With that statutory language, it’s clear the Fifth Congress knew the duty had
export implications. The 1797 Act stayed on the books for five years, and,
when it was repealed under the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, it was because
of a policy shift, not because of any perceived constitutional problems.97
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg thought, as had four dissenters in
Fairbank v. United States,98 decided in 1901, that the 1797 statute should be
given controlling weight in determining the original understanding of the
Export Clause: “We have always been reluctant to say a statute of this early
origin offends the Constitution, absent clear inconsistency.”99 And Kennedy
and Ginsburg rejected the idea that the Fifth Congress had been trying
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100. Id. at 876 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15 , §
51, 1 Stat. 199, 210-11 (tax on distilled spirits); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51 , § 14, 1 Stat.
384, 387 (tax on snuff and refined sugar)). Section 51 of the 1791 Act, for example,
provided that
if any of the said spirits [otherwise subject to the levy]. . . . shall, after
the last day of June next, be exported from the United States to any
foreign port or place, there shall be an allowance to the exporter or
exporters thereof, by way of drawback, equal to the duties thereupon,
according to the rates in each case by this act imposed.
Act of Mar. 3, 1791, supra, §  51, 1  Stat. at 210; see a lso Act of June 5, 1794, supra, §
14, 1 Stat. at 387 (providing similar drawback). Refunding duties paid on exported
spirits, including spirits not earmarked for exportation at the time of distillation, was
more generous than the modern understanding requires. See infra Part III.B.1.b (discuss-
ing Court’s conclusion that pre-export taxation of ultimately exported  goods is
permissible).
101. IBM, 517 U.S. at 876 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
to circumvent the Export Clause. The early Congresses were
scrupulous in honoring the Export Clause by making specific
exemptions for exports in laws imposing general taxes on
goods. Their refusal to grant exporters similar exemptions
from insurance taxes indicates that those taxes were not
viewed as equivalent to taxes on goods.100
In the Kennedy-Ginsburg view, when a founding Congress acted with noble
motives in enacting a statute that wasn’t clearly inconsistent with the Export
Clause, we should assume that constitutional requirements, as originally
understood, had been satisfied. Therefore, Kennedy and Ginsburg concluded,
“[t]axes on insurance do not offend the Export Clause.”101
Using the 1797 Act as a definitive statement of original intent has its
problems. For one thing, some understandings implicit in the Act were
discarded long ago, and properly so. It should be no surprise to legal scholars
that Congress, even in 1797, wasn’t always careful in drafting. Unless we’re
going to revive a few suspect ideas – for example, that the term “export”
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102. See supra note 9 (quoting 1797 Act language including in category of
“goods . . . exported [those transported] from one district to another district of the
United States, not being in the same State”). The founders weren’t always clear on this
point because the states had a much stronger sense of independence in the post-
Revolutionary period than we recognize today. But implicit in almost all the founding
debates was the assumption that “exports” referred only to transfers to foreign nations,
and, in any event, that’s clearly the law today. See United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S.
1, 13 (1915).
103. We’re talking about the Fifth  Congress, after all. Even if early Congresses
are entitled to deference in constitutional matters, the Fifth is presumably entitled to less
than the First or Second.
104. Interpretations of the early Supreme Court, made up of Federalist justices
trying to prop up a Federalist government, shouldn’t be taken at face value in
determining original understanding. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 8, at 1078
n.115. The same principle applies here: we need to be careful in attributing
constitutional principles to political actors who, in time-dishonored fashion, may have
been trying to push the limits of their power. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616  n.3
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting idea that public acts of founding generation in
support of religion are controlling in interpreting Establishment Clause: the acts “prove
only that public officials, no matter when they serve, can turn a blind  eye to
constitutional principle”).
105. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66 , 1 Stat. 577 (“An Act respecting Alien
Enemies”); Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596  (“An Act in addition to the act,
entitled ‘An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States’”).
106. The 1797 Act reached “[a]ny note or bill of lading, for any goods or
merchandise to be exported, if from one district to another district of the United States,
not being in the same state, ten cents; if to be exported to any foreign port or place,
twenty-five cents.” Act of July 6, 1797, Ch. 10, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, 528.
includes goods that merely cross state lines102 – we can’t defer totally to the
Fifth Congress.
And the IBM dissenters were too generous in their praise for that
Congress. Federalists in power didn’t always act in ways consistent with
constitutional language, particularly not by 1797,103 with Washington gone,
Federalism on the wane, and political nastiness at a high level.104 This was, we
should remember, the same Congress that enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts,
which aren’t often used as appropriate indicators of constitutional meaning.105
The 1797 Act itself included at least one provision that calls the
highmindedness of Congress into question – a tax on bills of lading for “goods
to be exported to any foreign port or place” imposed at a rate higher than that
applicable to domestic bills of lading.106 Yes, the late eighteenth century was
a more formalistic time than today, and maybe the tax on bills of lading wasn’t
as blatant a violation of the Export Clause as a tax imposed directly on exported
goods would have been. But obviously Congress legislated with the Clause in
mind – otherwise why not simply tax the goods? – and it’s hard to see this part
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107. In United States v. Fairbank, 181 U.S. 283 (1901), a divided Court
invalidated a statute similar to the 1797 Act in its application to, and discrimination
against, exports, see Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 6, 30 Stat. 448, holding in effect
that there was “clear inconsistency” between the Export Clause and the act: “when the
meaning and scope of a constitutional provision are clear, it cannot be overthrown by
legislative action, although several times repeated and never before challenged.” Fair-
bank, 181 U.S. at 311; see infra notes 258-266 and accompanying text. In IBM, Justice
Kennedy noted in the dissent that it was possible to accept Fairbank’s conclusion that
a tax on bills of lading was a proxy for taxing the goods, while still approving a tax on
insurance premiums:
The tax here , unlike the stamp duty in Fairbank, does not
discriminate against exports; it taxes a service distinct from the act of
exporting; and it has the clear regulatory purpose of eliminating a
perceived competitive advantage of foreign insurers. Viewed in this
light, the conclusion of the Fifth Congress that the Export Clause did
not bar any tax on export insurance should have great weight in
assessing the constitutionality of § 4371, and Fairbank is not to the
contrary.
IBM, 517 U.S. at 876-77 (Kennedy J., dissenting). The first quoted sentence makes
sense: if we were starting from scratch, those distinctions might justify different
treatment for a tax on insurance and a tax on bills of lading. But the 1797 Act as a whole
hardly supports Kennedy’s general proposition that we ought to defer to the Fifth
Congress because that body was sensitive to constitutional restraints.
108. In addition to  the tax on bills of lading, the 1797 Act contained another
provision, a tax on charter parties, the constitutionality of which was called into doubt
by later litigation. See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 10, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, 528 (imposing tax
of one dollar on “any charter-party”); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915)
(striking down 1898 tax on charter parties); infra notes 271-281 and accompanying text
(describing Hvoslef).
of the 1797 Act as anything other than a transparent attempt to circumvent the
limitations of the Export Clause.107
What participants in the early governments did is relevant in discerning
original understanding, of course, and I don’t mean to suggest otherwise. But
the IBM majority’s unwillingness to defer to the Fifth Congress on matters of
constitutional interpretation was eminently justifiable. For many reasons, we
should resist using the 1797 Act as a definitive indication of constitutional
meaning.108
3. The 1915 Precedent: Thames & Mersey – However imperfect the
Fifth Congress’s constitutional expertise may have been, or however indifferent
that Congress may have been to constitutional limitations, Justices Kennedy
and Ginsburg’s position in IBM ultimately didn’t depend on unqualified
acceptance of the 1797 Act. The constitutional status of a tax that reached
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109. One might argue, however, that, given the strong feelings against export
taxation evidenced in those debates, see supra Part I, any doubt about the legitimacy of
a tax with ties to exportation ought to be resolved against the tax. See infra Parts III.B.
4.d. and IV.
110. IBM , 517 U.S. at 864 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
111. I emphasize the “might,” however, because I also think it possible that a
court could  have concluded that the insurance premiums were  a proxy for the exported
goods. See infra notes 135, 137-144, and  148  and accompanying text.
112. See infra  notes 135, 137-144, and 148 and accompanying text.
113. 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
114. See Act of June 13 , 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448, 461 (imposing tax on,
among other things, marine, inland, and fire insurance policies “upon property . . .
whether against peril by sea or on inland waters,” measured by “the amount of premium
charged, one-half of one cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof”).
115. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 25.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id.
export insurance wasn’t an issue with a clearly right answer derivable from
constitutional text, structure, or original understanding; this sort of issue simply
hadn’t come up in founding debates.109 As a result, Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg’s conclusion that the tax on insurance premiums violated the Export
Clause because it reached “a service distinct from the goods and [was] not a
proxy for taxing the goods”110 was a plausible interpretation of the Clause. If
the IBM Court had been writing on a clean slate, the dissenters might have
carried the day.111
But IBM wasn’t a case of first impression, and taxpayer IBM had
precedent on its side – precedent that, as I’ll demonstrate below, had something
to be said for it.112 In 1915, in Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v.
United States,113 the Court used the Export Clause to invalidate an 1898 federal
stamp tax on policies insuring against marine risks insofar as the policies
related to export shipments. (The tax, part of a comprehensive scheme to raise
funds for the Spanish-American War, applied to insurance “upon property . .
. whether against peril by sea or on inland waters,” and was measured by the
“amount of premium charged.”114) The Thames & Mersey Court said the critical
question was whether “the tax upon such policies [is] so directly and closely
related to the ‘process of exporting’ that the tax is in substance a tax upon the
exportation.”115 Determining substance depended on “the actual course of
trade,”116 and, because it couldn’t “be doubted that insurance during the voyage
is by virtue of the demands of commerce an integral part of the exportation,”117
the Court held that the tax on insurance was forbidden by the Export Clause.
The parties in IBM agreed there was no fundamental difference
between the tax in Thames & Mersey and the tax in IBM, and that’s probably
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118. The tracing problem (which premiums related to exportation?) was easier
on the facts of Thames & Mersey than on the facts of IBM:
When the shipper had a cargo of goods ready for export, ‘designated
and set apart from all other goods for shipment on a particular  ship,’
he filled up certain blank forms of declaration (furnished to him by
the Company) in accordance with the facts of each case and delivered
the declaration to the Company at or about the time of the sailing of
the vessel with the cargo on board. In many cases the declaration was
not delivered until the vessel had sailed. Upon receiving each of the
declarations, the Company entered the amount and rate of the
premium and delivered to the shipper a certificate of insurance by
which the goods described were insured for the voyage and upon the
vessel specified.
Id. at 22-23. Accordingly, the Court was “not called upon to deal with transactions
which merely anticipate exportation, of [sic] with goods that are not in the course of
being actually exported.” Id. at 25.
IBM was harder, and, even then, Justice Kennedy complained that “[n]ot every
case will fit the simple model here: a policy written for a single shipment; coverage
beginning only with a common carrier picking up the goods from the warehouse or
manufacturing plant.” IBM, 517 U.S. at 871 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He saw
enforcement nightmares: “It would appear . . . that if a company has an open policy from
a foreign insurer covering the domestic leg of the journey for all shipments, the [Internal
Revenue Service] must untangle what portion of the insurance covered goods that had
commenced the process of exportation, and then prorate the tax.” Id. One answer to
Kennedy is that the Service doesn’t have to  untangle anything. Taxpayers must make out
a case for exemption.
119. The connection between the 1898  statute and the current Internal Revenue
Code isn’t direct. The modern statute is intended to protect the income tax system, by
taxing premiums paid to foreign insurers that aren’t subject to U.S. taxation, see supra
note 85 and accompanying text, and there was no income tax, personal or corporate, in
effect in 1898.
But the reference to “against peril by sea  or on inland waters”  in the 1898 Act
was identical to the phrase used in IRC of 1939 § 1804, the predecessor of current IRC
§ 4371. See supra notes 85 and  114 and accompanying text. Thus, despite the 1915
decision in Thames & Mersey, Congress retained statutory language that d irectly
implicated the Export Clause. The change to more neutral language was part of a 1942
effort to broaden the application of the tax to “insurance policies of all kinds.” See supra
note 85 and  accompanying text.
right.118 (In fact, the modern tax on premiums paid to foreign insurers is
traceable to the earlier statute. The language today is more neutral than it used
to be – making no reference to exports or anything smacking of exports – but
the language change wasn’t a response to constitutional difficulties.119) As
Justice Thomas put it, “A tax on policies insuring exports is not, precisely
speaking, the same as a tax on exports, but Thames & Mersey held that they
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120. IBM, 517 U.S. at 854.
121. Furthermore, as the IBM  dissenters noted, the Thames & Mersey Court
hadn’t been briefed on, and therefore hadn’t considered, the relevance of the 1797
statute. Id. at 877 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); supra Part II.A.2. It would have been
possible, therefore, for the Court in 1996 to  have concluded  that the Court in 1915 had,
through no fault of its own, misinterpreted original understanding.
122. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 39, at 3 (“Under the constitutional regime
inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the national
governments’s taxing, spending, and regulatory powers where the economy is concerned
– other than the requirement that government compensate owners if their property is
taken for public purposes.”).
123. The power had expanded to such a point that it was considered noteworthy
in academia when the modern Court held that Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause wasn’t limitless. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
124. The IBM dissenters’ position, that the tax on insurance premiums “taxes
a service distinct from the goods and is not a proxy for taxing the goods,” and, as a
result, “does not fall within the prohibition of the Export Clause,” IBM, 517 U.S. at 863
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) derived, in part, from Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276 (1976), and Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass’n  of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734 (1978), two Import-Export Clause cases.
125. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 850. Because Thames & Mersey hadn’t been
explicitly overruled, the lower courts in IBM felt bound to follow the case. See IBM, 31
Fed. Cl. 500, 506-07 (1994), aff’d, 59 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
126. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 856 (“Thames & Mersey has been controlling
precedent for over 80  years, and the Government does not, indeed could not, argue that
the rule established  there is ‘unworkable.’ . . . [T]here is simply no evidence that Thames
& Mersey has caused or will cause uncertainty in commercial export transactions.”). But
see Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 201-05 (questioning reliance on stare decisis in this
case).
were functionally the same under the Export Clause.”120 If Thames & Mersey
remained good law, therefore, the result in IBM was foreordained.
It wasn’t clear that Thames & Mersey still had vitality, however, and
that’s why there was a serious issue crying for resolution in IBM. A lot had
changed doctrinally since 1915.121 Courts had become much more willing to let
Congress unilaterally define what can be taxed;122 the national power over
commerce had expanded exponentially;123 and cases under the Import-Export
Clause seemed to have contracted the judicial understanding of what constitutes
a tax on exports.124 With a lot of favorable authority on its side, the government
asked to have Thames & Mersey overruled.125 That’s what IBM was – or should
have been – about.
Indeed, it’s difficult to see why the Court agreed to hear IBM unless it
was going to reconsider Thames & Mersey. Nevertheless, that didn’t happen.
In one chunk of his opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas discussed stare
decisis, rather than the merits of Thames & Mersey, concluding that IBM wasn’t
a case in which rejecting precedent – precedent that had established a
“workable” rule – was appropriate.126 Moreover, to the dissenters’ dismay,
Thomas said the government hadn’t even argued that a tax on services ought to
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127. Justice Thomas wrote that
one may question the finding in Thames & Mersey that the tax was
essentially a tax upon the exportation itself. . . . [T]he marine
insurance policies in Thames & Mersey arguably “had a value apart
from the value of the goods.” . . . Nevertheless, the Government
apparently has chosen not to challenge that aspect of Thames &
Mersey in this case.
IBM, 517  U.S. at 854 (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash.
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 756 n.21 (1978)). It would have been inappropriate,
he wrote, to examine the issue “without the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” id., and that
point was tied to the value of precedent: “The principles that animate our policy of stare
decisis caution against overruling a longstanding precedent on a theory not argued by
the parties . . . .” Id. at 856. The dissenters, however, said the government had made no
such concession. See id. at 866 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. In dissent, Justice Kennedy stressed that “the Thames & Mersey Court
relied in part on the theory that insurance is no t commerce,” id. at 877 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting), an understanding abandoned long ago. And Kennedy noted the Court had
approved
a state gross-receipts tax on a steam railroad, even as applied to the
railroad’s handling of exports and imports from its marine terminal
. . . . The tax “was not on the goods but on the handling of them at the
port,” . . . and “when the tax is on activities connected with the export
or import the range of immunity cannot be so wide.”
Id. at 878 (quoting Canton R.R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1951)); see also
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v.
Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (holding state taxation on
services, when not measured by value of goods, acceptable under Import-Export
Clause).
129. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 851 (“Our decades-long struggle over the meaning
of the nontextual negative command of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead  to
the conclusion that our interpretation of the textual command of the Export Clause is
equally fluid.”).
be treated as distinct from a tax on exported articles, and the Court therefore
wouldn’t consider that obviously critical issue.127 Finally, the Court rejected the
government’s argument that developments after 1915 in interpreting the
Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause were relevant to the Export
Clause.128 Those other provisions contain nothing like the clear “textual
command” of the Export Clause,129 said the Court, and it therefore discarded
the long-time understanding that the Export Clause and the Import-Export
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130.
We are . . . hesitant to adopt the Import-Export Clause’s
policy-based analysis without some indication that the Export Clause
was intended to alleviate the same “evils” to which the Import-Export
Clause was directed . Unlike the Import-Export Clause, which was
intended to pro tect federal supremacy in international commerce, to
preserve federal revenue from import duties and imposts, and to
prevent coastal States with ports from taking unfair advantage of
inland States, . . . the Export Clause serves none of those goals.
Indeed, textually, the Export Clause does quite the opposite. It
specifically prohibits Congress from regulating international
commerce through export taxes, disallows any attempt to raise federal
revenue from exports, and has no direct effect on the way the States
treat imports and exports.
Id. at 859.
131. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827).
132. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 857 (“We have good reason to hesitate before
adopting the analysis of our recent Import-Export Clause cases into our Export Clause
jurisprudence. . . . [M]eaningful textual differences exist [between the two Clauses] and
should not be  overlooked.”) . The Court didn’t summarily reject the relevance of all
Import-Export Clause cases in this context. Justice  Thomas suggested that Import-
Export Clause jurisprudence precludes state-imposed, “nondiscriminatory taxes on
imports and exports in transit,” id. at 861  – or a t least that the government hadn’t
convinced him otherwise – just as the Export Clause precludes such taxes. The Court
nonetheless refused to use Import-Export cases as aids in determining what constitutes
a tax or duty on exported articles. See infra Part III.C (discussing whether Export Clause
is really unique). 
133. IBM, 517 U.S. at 863.
134. Justice Kennedy complained: “It mystifies me that in a constitutional case,
where our decision is not subject to congressional revision, the Court here accepts the
Government’s purported concession of the meaning of the Export Clause without any
Clause should be read as a package, with mutually reinforcing goals.130 John
Marshall had written, in 1827, that “[t]here is some diversity in language
[between the clauses], but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited.”131
The IBM Court thought it knew better, however, apparently concluding that the
Export Clause is sui generis.132
After all this bobbing and weaving, none of which directly concerned
the merits of Thames & Mersey, the Court concluded that “[r]eexamination of
the question whether a particular assessment on an activity or service is so
closely connected to the goods as to amount to a tax on the goods themselves
must await another day.”133 As a result, the key issue in the case, perhaps the
only issue, wasn’t addressed – a peculiar way for the Court to handle its first
Export Clause case in decades.134
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independent examination of the question, and then invokes the Export Clause to strike
down a statute.” Id. at 870 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
135. See supra text accompanying note 12. Once we get beyond the idea that
the only cases to which the Export Clause might apply are Marbury-like hypotheticals
— and no one thinks the Export Clause is so limited, see supra note 90 —  attempts to
define a bright-line rule are doomed. And they might be doomed anyway. Even with a
tax on the exportation of flour, say, it’s still necessary to determine the point at which
a tax attaches to flour that might, or might not, be headed for exportation. No bright-line
rule can control that determination. See infra Part III.B.3.
136. See supra text accompanying note 94.
137. See supra notes 85 and  114  and accompanying text.
138. IBM, 517 U.S. at 879-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Premiums, i.e., the
price of insurance, depend on risk of loss and value of the goods is only one component
factor of risk.”).
139. Assume A ships one $100 widget and B  ships two $100 widgets on the
same vessel. The three widgets are stored in precisely the same circumstances,  and the
likelihood of loss is therefore the same. Ignoring any volume discounts, or any other
reason for treating A or B specially, one would  expect B’s insurance bill to be twice A’s.
Since the same analysis could also apply under the Import-Export Clause, the
Court could have decided IBM in favor of the taxpayer without also  concluding, as it
did, that Import-Export Clause cases are irrelevant in interpreting the Export Clause. In
Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978),
the Court held that a state tax was permissible because it didn’t “relate[] to the value of
the goods, and  therefore . . . . [wasn’t] taxation upon the goods themselves.” Id. at 757.
Insurance premiums do relate to the value of goods, and a tax on premiums could
therefore be characterized as a tax on the insured goods – under either clause.
Thames & Mersey wasn’t necessarily wrongly decided, and the result
in IBM therefore wasn’t necessarily wrong either. Evaluating whether a levy is
really on exports can’t be as easy as Chief Justice Marshall’s examples in
Marbury might have suggested.135 Furthermore, had the Court reached the
merits of Thames & Mersey in IBM, it might have concluded that the tax on
premiums was in fact a “proxy for taxing the goods,” to borrow a phrase from
the dissenters,136 and therefore invalid.
In fact, Thames & Mersey made some sense. I can imagine at least two
ways in which the Court might have concluded that the taxes in IBM and
Thames & Mersey were “prox[ies] for taxing the goods,” and that Thames &
Mersey therefore had been rightly decided. First, in both cases, the taxes were
measured by the amount of insurance premiums paid,137 a figure that correlates
with the value of exported cargo. Insurance rates reflect other factors as well,
of course – as the dissenters emphasized138 – but, all other things being equal,
the higher the value of cargo, the higher the cost of insurance, and therefore the
higher any tax on premiums.139 If, as one commentator sympathetic to the
Kennedy-Ginsburg dissent has suggested, the question should have been
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140. Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 200-01 (“If the Court had reached this
issue in IBM, it might have adopted Justice Kennedy’s sensible approach, which focused
on whether the cost of the export service taxed correlates tightly with the value of the
exported goods.”).
141. See id.
142. Dissenting Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg seemed to assume that, if the
tax weren’t measured by the value of the goods, it shouldn’t be treated as falling on
“exported articles,” see, e.g., IBM, 517 U.S. at 879-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), but the
Export Clause doesn’t speak in those terms.
143. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 26.
144. If there is a “tight correlation,” the tax ought to be treated as falling on
exported articles. But failing to satisfy a tight-correlation test shouldn’t lead to any
particular result under the Export Clause.
145. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
146. Although the government in IBM relied heavily on the argument that lack
of discrimination matters under the Export Clause, the older cases and the language of
“whether the cost of the export service taxed correlate[d] tightly with the value
of the exported goods,”140 the Court might have answered that question “Yes.”
So the Court could have taken the dissenters’ test on its own terms, and
concluded that the tax on insurance premiums failed the test. (The assumption
of the IBM dissenters, and of the commentator, was that the “proxy” test would
automatically have led to upholding the tax,141 but that’s not necessarily true.)
And there’s another way the IBM Court could have reconfirmed the result of
Thames & Mersey. The “tight correlation” idea is an accurate restatement of the
dissenters’ position in IBM, but it isn’t a test mandated by the Export Clause.
Nothing in the Export Clause requires that, for a tax or duty to be prohibited,
it be tied to the value of exported articles.142 A one cent per shipment tax on
exports is as impermissible under the Export Clause as is a one percent tax
measured by the value of the exported goods.
Had it reached the merits in IBM, the Court might simply have
concluded, as it had in Thames & Mersey, that “insurance during the voyage is
by virtue of the demands of commerce an integral part of the exportation,”143
and, as a result, that a tax on insurance premiums is a proxy for taxing the
goods – regardless of the relationship between amount of tax and value of
goods and regardless of the correlation between the cost of the insurance and
the value of the goods.144 A tax on a service that is “integrally related” to
exportation might very well be treated as on exported articles.145
If the IBM Court had reexamined the foundation of Thames & Mersey,
it could have found the case structurally sound, under either of the above
rationales, or, following Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, it could have issued
a condemnation order. It did neither. By deferring the key issue, the Court
provided no guidance about how disputes should be analyzed, other than
emphasizing that discrimination is irrelevant – something we knew already146
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the Clause itself pointed in the opposite direction. See supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text.
147. The Import-Export Clause applies to “Imposts or Duties,” and the Export
Clause to “Tax[es] or Dut[ies],” but the assumption had been that the process of
determining whether a levy is on “Exports” or “Articles exported” is the same under the
two clauses. See supra note 131 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall); infra Part III.C.1.
148. It’s possible, however, that cutting the tie between the two clauses does
simplify matters, in the following way. The Court may have decided that the cases under
the two clauses had developed in irreconcilable ways. They should have been consistent,
at least for purposes of determining whether a levy is on exports, as John Marshall
suggested, see supra note 131, but the Import-Export Clause cases had become so
permissive that the rules developed there simply don’t work with the “clear textual
command” of the Export Clause. See infra Part III.C.1. Ignoring those cases may
therefore make the Export Clause stronger — and simpler.
149. Is Congress supposed to try again with a tax on insurance premiums,
leading eventually to resolution of the issue now left for “another day”? Or, facing this
uncertainty, does Congress give up on the issue, thereby insuring that “another day”
never comes?
150. The way IBM was decided suggests that many Justices wound up wishing
they hadn’t granted the petition for writ of certiorari in the first place, maybe because
they hadn’t realized  how intractable (or boring) the case would be. Once the petition was
granted, however, the Court was locked in. Dismissing the petition as improvidently
granted was a possibility, but one the Court uses sparingly. Adhering to precedent was
a way to resolve the d ispute, while ducking broader issues.
151. See supra note 125.
– and suggesting that the Export Clause occupies a world of its own, a
conclusion that, by shrinking the universe of arguably relevant authority, may
not simplify matters. If Import-Export Clause jurisprudence can’t be used to
help determine whether a levy is on exports under the Export Clause – as had
been done since at least 1827147 –  the only authority under the Export Clause
is a body of cases predating 1924.148
Thames & Mersey was thus left standing, but plastered with “Enter at
your own risk” signs. All that we know for sure after IBM is that taxes on
export insurance are forbidden today, but maybe they won’t be forbidden
tomorrow. It’s as if the Court had said, Perhaps the rules have changed, but
we’re not going to tell you for sure until later. Deferring consideration of the
key issue for “another day,” after having revived interest in the Export Clause
simply by taking the case, wasn’t helpful to anybody, including Congress,
which must legislate in the shadow of IBM.149
4. Why Care About IBM? – IBM wasn’t one of the high points in the
history of the Supreme Court. The case was an exercise in judicial evasion,150
and substantively the Court seemed to do little more than leave in place a 1915
precedent, Thames & Mersey, on which lower courts had relied.151 In form, by
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152. Several cases in the 1920s, including Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920), rejected provisions of the personal income tax on the ground that the taxed items
weren’t “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. As recently as 1934,
the Supreme Court took limits on the taxing power for granted. See Helvering v.
Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) (“If the statute lays taxes on the
part of the building occupied by the owner or upon the rental value of that space , it
cannot be sustained, for that would be to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment.”);
Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 8, at 1133-46. After 1934, however, no federal tax
was rejected on constitutional grounds until IBM. The pervasive view in the academic
world  is that, apart from due-process limitations unlikely ever to come into play
(Congress couldn’t tax members of different races differently, for example), Congress
can tax what it wants when it wants. Cf., e.g., Ackerman, supra note 39, at 3.
153. Wrote Justice Kennedy:
The majority cites no case in which we have declared a federal statute
unconstitutional by disregarding an unargued theory that would save
the statute . . . . We should at least consider a construction of the
Export Clause that would render it inapplicable . . ., rather than
assuming the issue away and reaching the unnecessary judgment that
a coordinate branch violated the Constitution.
IBM, 517 U.S. at 869 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 868 (“To give Congress
the respect it is owed, we must decide whether the  statute is in fact unconstitutional as
applied, not make the borderline call that the Government’s litigation position bars us
from reaching a question . . . .”).
blessing an old case, albeit in a backhanded way, the Court merely preserved
the status quo.
Not so. The mere fact that the Court agreed to hear IBM suggests that
it sees a continuing role for the Export Clause – why spend precious judicial
time otherwise? – and that, by itself, was a significant development. In addition,
the Court used the Constitution to repudiate the application of a tax statute,
something that hadn’t happened in decades,152 and, in taking that step, the Court
showed little deference to Congress, as the dissenters complained.153 Rather
than presuming that the application of the tax was constitutional, and looking
for ways to interpret the statute in a constitutionally acceptable way, the Court
left in place a 1915 case that did neither of those things. It would have been
noteworthy if the Court had struck down the application of a tax after carefully
reviewing the substance of the dispute; it’s astonishing that the Court did so in
this summary fashion.
When the Court adhered to rules of taxation developed in the second
decade of the twentieth century, it wasn’t preserving the status quo. The
astonishing effect of IBM is that, in avoiding the merits, the Court effectively
revived a tradition of judicial scrutiny of taxing statutes that nearly all
commentators assumed had disappeared forever. By agreeing to hear IBM and
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154. There were pressures to act. When U.S. Shoe was being argued, 4000
cases with the same issue had been stayed in the Court of International Trade, and over
100 in the Court of Federal Claims. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523
U.S. 360, 365  n.2 (1998) (citing Brief for United States at 4).
155. Which should happen once Reader’s Digest picks up this article.
156. 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
157. IRC § 4461(a). “Port use” means “the loading of commercial cargo on, or
. . . the unloading of commercial cargo from, a commercial vessel at a port.” IRC §
4462(a)(2).
158. IRC § 4462(a)(3)(A). For these purposes, “cargo” includes “passengers
transported for compensation or hire.” Id. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International
Trade, concluding in both cases that the HMT was valid ly applied to cruise ship
passengers. See K eith E. Ranta, Note, The Harbor Maintenance Tax and  the
Constitutionality of Taxing Cruise Passengers as Commercial Cargo Under the Export
Clause: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 54 Tax Law. 211 (2001); see
generally Sara Lundell, Note, Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States: Will the Love
then refusing to substantively reexamine Thames & Mersey, the Court
effectively transferred to the late twentieth century the doctrines of an earlier
era, when courts were much more skeptical about the taxing power.
And there’s another important point about IBM. Although the Court
fumbled the analysis, it came to a defensible result. Constitutional limitations
on the taxing power should be taken seriously in 2003, just as they were in
1915.
B. U.S. Shoe
Considering how badly it handled IBM, the Supreme Court should
probably have decided to leave the Export Clause alone for another seventy
years. But that wasn’t to be. Two years later, the Court revisited the Export
Clause and again got the right result (or arguably the right result) – this time
after full consideration of the issues – rejecting the application of a federal tax
in the export context.154 No longer could there be any doubt about the Court’s
signal: the Export Clause should be seen as a limitation on congressional
power. If Export Clause jurisprudence were a matter of public interest,155 cries
of “judicial activism” would have been heard across the land.
1. The Harbor Maintenance Tax – In U.S. Shoe,156 the Court considered
whether the Harbor Maintenance Tax (the “HMT”), as it applied to exports,
was an invalid tax or duty on exported articles. In general, the HMT is an
excise imposed on any “port use” in an amount now equal to 0.125%  of the
value of the “commercial cargo” involved.157 “Commercial cargo” is “any cargo
transported on a commercial vessel,” including exported goods.158
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Boat Finally Sink the Harbor Maintenance Tax?, 8 M inn. J. Global Trade 325 (1999).
The Federal Circuit gave great weight to regulations interpreting the HMT, but the most
straightforward justification for the results is that the founders wouldn’t have considered
a passenger (with the possible exception of a slave) to be an “Article” under the Export
Clause, and modern usage of the term also doesn’t suggest that it includes people.
159. See supra note 83 and  accompanying text.
160. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363. The proceeds are deposited in a fund from
which Congress can appropriate amounts for harbor maintenance and development
projects. See IRC § 9505(a).
161. See Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375-76 (1876); infra notes 188-193 and
accompanying text.
162. The HM T was enacted as part of the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, §§ 1401-03, 100 Stat. 4082, 4266-70. See U.S. Shoe, 523
U.S. at 363.
163. The HM T was also to be administered and enforced “as if [it] were a
customs duty.” IRC § 4462(f)(1), (2).
164. See Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir.
1960) (“It is not necessary to uphold the validity of [a] tax . . . that the tax itself bear an
accurate label.”).
165. Congress really wasn’t paying attention. Reports on the HMT  used the
terms “tax” and “fee” without precision, and without sensitivity to constitutional
concerns. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 112 (1986) (“national uniform fee”); H.R.
Rep. No. 99-228, at 1 and 7 (1986) (“port user charges” and “port use charge”); H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 99-1013, at 228-29 (1986) (describing House version as imposing “port
use tax” and “excise tax on the use of a U.S. harbor” and Senate version as imposing
“charge (in the Internal Revenue Code) . . . on the use”); id. at 230 (describing
conference agreement as imposing “port use tax or charge” or “excise tax in the Internal
Revenue Code”).
One reason Congress ignored the Export Clause may be that the discussion
focused on the HMT’s application to imports, which the national government can tax.
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 133 (1986) (additional views of Sen. Mitchell). But if
Since there was no question that the HMT did apply to exported
articles, and since the Court had reiterated in IBM that lack of discrimination
against exports doesn’t matter for these purposes,159 the government was left to
argue that the HMT wasn’t a “tax or duty” at all. It was, the government said,
a fee for use of the ports – “a charge designed as compensation for
government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits”160 – and the government
pointed to authority going back to 1876 in support of the proposition that a user
fee isn’t forbidden by the Export Clause.161
Apparently oblivious to Export Clause concerns in enacting the HMT
in 1986,162 Congress called the HMT a “tax,” and placed it in the Internal
Revenue Code.163 As embarrassing as that designation may have been –
Congress seemed to be asking for an Export Clause challenge – that wasn’t the
real constitutional problem.164 Congressional acts aren’t invalid simply because
Congress acts in ignorance, paying no attention to constitutional dictates.165
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Congress had been sensitive to effects on international commerce, it should have been
concerned about possible Export Clause violations.
166. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363. The Court of International Trade had come
to the same conclusion: “The Tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the
cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo . . . . Congress could not have
imposed the Tax any closer to exportation, or more immediate to  the articles exported .”
U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408, 418 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
167. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 370.
168. For example, in Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876), in upholding a
charge as a user fee, the  Court said that,
[t]he rule by which [the amounts] are estimated may be an arbitrary
one; but an arbitrary rule may be more convenient and less onerous
than any other which can be adopted. . . . [H]aving due regard to that
latitude of discretion which the legislature is entitled to  exercise in the
selection of the means for attaining a constitutional object, we cannot
say that the charge imposed is excessive, or that it amounts to an
infringement of the constitutional provision referred to.
Id. at 375-76.
What was crucial in U.S. Shoe was the substance of the charge. Did the
payor receive something specific in return for its payment, as part of a value-
for-value transaction similar to that which might occur in a commercial
context? Or were the benefits to the payor, if discernible at all, merely the more
generalized ones that every taxpayer gets from paying his, her, or its share of
the costs of civilization? The HMT failed constitutionally, held the unanimous
Court, because the measure of the charge, the value of the cargo, wasn’t “a fair
approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters.”166
If the HMT wasn’t part of a value-for-value transaction, it had to be a tax, not
a fee. And insofar as the tax applied to exported articles, it was invalid under
the Export Clause.
2. Taxes Versus Other Governmental Levies – Reasonable people can
disagree about how close the relationship should be between amount charged
and the value of a specific benefit received for a charge to be treated as a user
fee rather than a tax. To be a fee, said the U.S. Shoe Court, the HMT had to
“fairly match the exporters’ use of port services and facilities,”167 but that
formulation necessarily leaves wiggle room. The benefits provided by
governments are often of a sort not readily available in the marketplace, making
determination of a “fair match” problematic. Recognizing this difficulty, the
Court hasn’t required absolute equivalence (whatever that would mean)
between value and charge for a charge to be treated as a fee.168 Ultimately, and
inevitably, characterization is going to depend on the facts and circumstances.
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169. Id. at 376.
170. The Customs Service, by form letter, had stated that “the HM T is a
statutorily mandated fee assessment on port users, not an unconstitutional tax on
exports,” U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S . at 364, but that self-serving designation obviously
couldn’t be controlling.
171. See supra note 165.
172. 92 U.S. 372 (1876).
173. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 370 (quoting Pace, 92 U.S. at 376).
174. Congress in enacting the HMT hadn’t  tried to disguise the levy as a user
fee. Furthermore, the “guard against” language came from a case, Pace, in which the
levy at issue was held to be a permissible user fee, not a disguised tax. 92 U.S. at 376.
Pace was therefore also not a case of congressional overreaching. See infra notes 188-
193  and accompanying text.
175. Quoted in Ellin Rosenthal & Pat Jones, Year in Review, 46 Tax Notes 16,
16 (1990) (quoting Office of Management and Budget Director-designate). Darman was
interpreting the first President Bush’s “no new taxes” pledge, and  his statement came to
stand for the wrong-headed proposition that any governmental exaction is a “tax.”
176. This distinction is recognized  statutorily. For example, many state “taxes”
are deductible in computing federal taxable income, see IRC § 164 , but fees for benefits
aren’t taxes for this purpose. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-29, 1977-1 C.B. 44 (“Taxes are not
payments for some special privilege granted or service rendered . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 61-
152, 1961-2 C.B. 42 (to same effect). And many foreign taxes are either creditab le or
deductible in computing taxable income, see IRC §§ 901–903, but a payment to a
foreign country for a specific economic benefit isn’t a tax for this purpose. See Regs. §
As the Court put it in 1876, “[T]he sense and reason of the thing will generally
determine the character of every case that can arise.”169
But that’s not to say that anything goes, that a charge is a fee just
because Congress characterizes it that way. Congress hadn’t done that with the
HMT anyway – it was the Department of Justice lawyers defending the HMT
who argued that the HMT wasn’t a tax170 – so U.S. Shoe wasn’t a case of
congressional duplicity. (Ignorance perhaps, but not duplicity.171) The Court
nevertheless saw the case as an opportunity to send Congress a message,
picking up language from Pace v. Burgess,172 decided over 100 years earlier:
“[I]f we are ‘to guard against . . . the imposition of a [tax] under the pretext of
fixing a fee,’ . . . we must hold that the HMT violates the Export Clause as
applied to exports.”173
That message was gratuitous – it had nothing to do with the actual
dispute in U.S. Shoe174 – but it contained a core of good sense. Despite the
tendency in popular discourse to treat all governmental exactions as
indistinguishable – Richard Darman’s statement that if a charge “looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck” is an example of
this phenomenon175 – all charges aren’t identical. There’s a legally significant
difference between the quack of a fee – a charge to get into a park, for example
– and the quack of a more abstract levy, a tax.176
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1.901-2(a)(2)(i)  (“[A] foreign levy is not pursuant to a foreign country’s authority to
levy taxes, and thus is not a tax, to the extent a person subject to the levy receives (or
will receive). . . a specific economic benefit . . . from the foreign county in exchange for
payment pursuant to the levy.”).
177. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
178. Id.
179. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
180. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
181. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
182. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
183. For example, when the language of the general taxing power (“Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1) was discussed at the
Convention, Luther Martin “asked what was meant by the Committee of detail (in the
expression) ‘duties’ and ‘imposts.’ If the meaning were the same, the former was
unnecessary; if different, the matter ought to be made clear.” 2 Farrand, supra note 20,
at 305 (Aug. 16, 1787). James W ilson responded, “[D]uties are applicable to many
objects to which the word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to
commerce; the former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c.” Id.
184. I’ve argued elsewhere that the term “Taxes” in Article I, section 8, was an
umbrella term that encompassed the “Duties, Imposts, and Excises” subject to the
uniformity rule as well as the direct taxes subject to the apportionment requirement. See
Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 8, at 2393-97; see also Jensen, Taxation and the
Constitution, supra note 8, at 694-99.
185. One exception: The Court in IBM gave as one of the reasons that the
Import-Export Clause can’t be used to interpret the Export Clause the “meaningful
textual differences” between the two clauses, including the difference between “Tax or
Duty” and “Imposts or Duties.” IBM, 517 U.S. at 857. I agree that the term “tax” is
broader than “impost,” see supra note 184, and the prohibition under the Export Clause
should be broader than under the Import-Export Clause. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 857
(recognizing “that the Import-Export Clause is ‘not written in terms of a broad
prohibition of every “tax,”’ and that impost and duty are narrower terms than tax”)
To be sure, that distinction doesn’t jump out from the founding debates
or the language of the Constitution. The founders’ terminology for
governmental exactions was so varied that a search for certainty in
characterizing levies is doomed: “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” in
Article I, section 8;177 “Duties, Imposts, and Excises” in the Uniformity
Clause;178 “Tax or Duty” in the Export Clause179 and in the clause limiting a
levy on the “Migration or Importation” of slaves to “ten dollars for each
Person”;180 “Imposts or Duties” in the Import-Export Clause;181 and “Tax” or
“Taxes” in the Direct-Tax Clauses.182 Most of these provisions have a core of
good sense, but it’s doubtful that each term standing alone had a precisely
understood meaning. There’s overlap among the terms183 – “imposts,” “duties,”
and “excises” are “taxes,” for example, at least for some purposes184 – and cases
generally haven’t turned on fine distinctions among the terms, even when they
might exist.185
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(quoting Michelin T ire Corp. v. W ages, 423 U .S. 276, 290-93 (1976)); id. at 857-58
(noting “that the term ‘Impost or Duty’ [in the Import-Export Clause] is not self-defining
and does not necessarily encompass all taxes’ and . . . ‘the central holding of Michelin
[is] that the absolute ban is only of ‘Imposts or Duties’ and not of all taxes’”) (quoting
Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759
(1978)). But it should also be true that a state levy on exports that fails Import-Export
Clause requirements would be prohibited to the national government under the Export
Clause. See infra Part III.C.1.
186. The Import-Export Clause does include a passage that creates some
interpretational difficulty: it permits a state to lay imposts or duties without
congressional consent if do ing so is “absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
Laws.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. It’s been said that “[t]he inspection fees which may
properly be imposed under this c lause are in no sense a duty on imports or exports, but
are a compensation for services.” Thomas M. Cooley, The Law of Taxation (4th ed.,
Clark A. Nichols ed., 1924). But if the fees are user fees, why mention them at all,
because they wouldn’t have been precluded  anyway?
187. The founders’ silence doesn’t mean Congress has no power to impose fees
in cases in which specific economic benefits are received by payors (assuming, of
course, that Congress has the power to provide the goods or services in the first place).
Such fees may be necessary to prevent unwarranted subsidies to the beneficiaries of the
goods or services. But see Kelly & Amzel, supra note 6 (arguing that U.S. Shoe Court
improperly let Commerce power trump Export Clause); infra Part III.A.2 (discussing
Kelly & Amzel article).
188. 92 U.S. 372 (1876).
Nevertheless, none of these terms works in context if understood to
include garden-variety governmental charges for services or other benefits.
How, for example, can Congress apportion a fee for services among the states
on the basis of population, as it would have to if the fee were a direct “tax”?
Should the Export Clause or the Import-Export Clause really be interpreted to
preclude the appropriate governmental body from charging those who use ports
and harbors?186 And if a federal charge is imposed for use of a particular port,
what would it mean to require that the charge be “uniform” throughout the
United States? Surely the Constitution can’t require that the same fee be
charged for services provided in every U.S. port, regardless of the value (or the
cost) of the services. One of the reasons the fee-tax distinction doesn’t appear
in the founding debates is that the founders, when discussing provisions dealing
with taxation, simply weren’t talking about charges for specific benefits.187
The distinction between a fee and a tax also has support in older
Supreme Court cases construing the Export Clause. For example, the stamp tax
upheld in Pace v. Burgess,188 decided in 1876 (a case on which the Court relied
in U.S. Shoe), was determined to have been “compensation given for services
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189. Id. at 375. In IBM, Justice Thomas did at one point cite Pace for the
proposition “that pre-export products are not ‘Articles exported,’” IBM, 517 U.S. at 846,
as if that had been the reason for upholding the charge at issue in the case. And the
Court had provided this alternative justification for the result in Pace  when it
reexamined the same stamp-tax statute in Turpin  v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504 (1886). See
infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. But Thomas quickly switched gears and got
the Pace rationale right: “When a tobacco manufacturer challenged the stamp charge,
we upheld the charge on the basis that the stamps were designed to prevent fraud in the
export exemption from the excise tax and did not, therefore, represent a tax on exports.”
IBM, 517  U.S. at 847 (emphasis added). Although Turp in did supply an alternative
rationale to justify the result in Pace, it’s absolutely clear  from the short Pace opinion
that the Court concluded, under the circumstances, that the stamp levy was not a “tax or
duty.” See infra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
190. Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 74, 15 Stat. 125, 157-58.
191. Pace, 92 U.S. at 375 (quoted in U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 369).
192. Ultimately the question depends on correlation:
Pace establishes that . . . the connection between a service the
Government renders and  the compensation it receives for that service
must be closer than is present here. Unlike the stamp charge in
Pace,the HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis. The
value of export cargo, however, does not correlate reliably with the
federal harbor services used or usable by the exporter.
U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 369 (emphasis added).
properly rendered” and hence not a tax or duty.189 Congress had enacted an
excise tax on tobacco, generally thirty-two cents per pound, but with an
exemption for tobacco intended for exportation. Exported tobacco was instead
required to have a twenty-five cent stamp affixed to each package, regardless
of the package’s size or value.190
The taxpayers in Pace argued that the charge for the stamp on exported
tobacco was itself a forbidden tax or duty on exports, but the Court
characterized the charge as, in effect, a user fee. Unlike the tax in U.S. Shoe, the
charge “bore no proportion whatever to the quantity or value of the package on
which [the stamp] was affixed.”191 Ad valorem levies like the HMT thus
shouldn’t be characterized as user fees for these purposes: if a harbor usage fee
is going to be measured by value, it should be the value of the benefit provided
(presumably determined by the amount or manner of harbor use), not the value
of the goods being shipped.192 Furthermore, the stamps in Pace had a payment-
for-services flavor: they were intended to prevent fraud, and the proceeds from
the stamps were used to fund the administrative mechanism necessary to police
the excise tax. In short, said the Court, “A stamp may be used, and, in the case
before us, we think it is used, for quite a different purpose. . . [than] a tax or
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193. Pace, 92 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added).
194. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing fees for patent applications).
195. 92 U.S. 372 (1876).
196. See supra Part II.A.3.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 (1989) (holding
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duty: indeed, it is used for the very contrary purpose, – that of securing
exemption from a tax or duty.”193
The distinction between a user fee and a tax may be important in other
ways as well,194 but, at a minimum, it’s a distinction inherent in the structure of
the Export Clause.
3. The Significance of U.S. Shoe – On the importance of the distinction
between tax and fee in interpreting the Export Clause, the U.S. Shoe Court thus
got it right: not all governmental charges that affect exportation are limited by
the Export Clause. As it did with IBM, the Court applied old precedent to a
modern controversy: what the Court said about the Export Clause in 1876, in
Pace v. Burgess,195 has continuing significance today. Furthermore, in U.S.
Shoe, the Court left no doubt that the old precedent was the law now and in the
future. The Court blessed Pace in a way that it wouldn’t bless Thames &
Mersey in IBM.196
All of that’s important, but even more important is the confirmation
that what the Court had done in IBM – striking down a taxing statute on
constitutional grounds – wasn’t an accident. Congressional enactments in
taxation are no longer automatically immune from judicial scrutiny.
As was true in IBM, however, the Court emphasized the uniqueness of
the Export Clause. In other contexts, the government argued, the Court had
characterized some flat and ad valorem levies as user fees, even though the
charges bore no necessary, or even arguable, relationship to the value of
benefits received.197 But, wrote Justice Ginsburg, those cases didn’t matter;
they “involved constitutional provisions other than the Export Clause, . . . and
thus do not govern here.”198 “IBM plainly stated,” wrote Ginsburg, “that the
Export Clause’s simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties
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distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on governmental taxing
authority.”199 I’ll return to the question of whether the Export Clause’s “simple,
direct, unqualified prohibition” really makes it unique later in the article.200
III. INTERPRETATIONAL ISSUES AFTER IBM AND U.S. SHOE:
NEW LIFE FOR OLD CASES
At first glance, as I’ve noted, the Court didn’t seem to do anything
striking in either IBM or U.S. Shoe. It pointedly avoided reevaluating a 1915
case in IBM, and then relied on an 1876 precedent in U.S. Shoe. If the Court
had heard the disputes in 1916, the results would presumably have been the
same as they were in the late 1990s. It’s as if Woodrow Wilson were still in the
White House . . . old news.
But it’s because of the time warp that the results in the two cases were
striking. Resuscitating old doctrines isn’t old news. IBM and U.S. Shoe made
it clear that the Export Clause is alive and well, and, while that wouldn’t have
been noteworthy in 1916, it certainly was in 1996 and 1998. Moreover, by
leaving a 1915 precedent in place, and by explicitly relying on an 1876
decision, the Court in effect told us to start retrieving a lot of other old Export
Clause cases that, as far as many students of taxation were concerned, had been
transferred to the intellectual equivalent of offsite storage.
In this part of the article, I discuss the state of Export Clause
jurisprudence, which, after IBM and U.S. Shoe, in many respects still means the
state of pre-1924 Export Clause jurisprudence. First, I consider whether any
issues remain in distinguishing taxes and duties from other levies, and I
criticize the argument, made by two scholars, that we shouldn’t even be trying
to make such a distinction. Second, I extract principles from cases that have
tried to determine in some difficult, and some not so difficult, situations when
a tax or duty that has an arguable effect on exportation ought to be treated as
falling on exported articles. Finally, I question the Court’s assertion, in both
IBM and U.S. Shoe, that the Export Clause is unique – that the Clause neither
illuminates, nor is illuminated by, other constitutional provisions.
A. Taxes Versus Other Charges
Unless the terms “tax” and “duty” subsume all conceivable exactions,
the Export Clause doesn’t seem to apply to everything: “No Tax or Duty shall
be laid on Articles exported from any State.”201 And, as I argued above, the
Court in U.S. Shoe did a respectable job of distinguishing between taxes or
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duties, on the one hand, and user fees, on the other, in the process of concluding
that the Export Clause isn’t an absolute prohibition of all governmental charges
on exports.202
1. Is Anything Other Than a User Fee Permitted? – One question the
Court didn’t answer in U.S. Shoe – it didn’t have to – is whether user fees are
the only permissible charges on exportation or whether Congress has the power
to enact still other types of levies without running afoul of the Export Clause.
The Export Clause effectively divides the universe of levies into taxes and
duties – which can’t fall on exported articles – and everything else. Does the
“everything else” include any charge that isn’t a user fee (and that also isn’t a
tax or duty)? Given the founders’ bewildering variety of terms for
governmental exactions,203 the classification scheme inherent in the Export
Clause might be even more complex than U.S. Shoe suggests.
Who knows? I certainly don’t. But I’m skeptical that this will turn into
a real litigation issue, at least in the near future. No court has yet uncovered a
permissible charge on exports that isn’t a user fee, and I doubt that future courts
will want to search for such a linguistically possible, but perhaps mythical,
concept.204 If my skepticism is justified, the key distinction under the Export
Clause will remain the one outlined in U.S. Shoe: taxes or duties versus user
fees.205
And that’s an important distinction. To conclude, as the Court did in
U.S. Shoe, that Congress may impose value-for-value charges affecting
exportation without being constrained by the Export Clause isn’t a trivial result
– even if that’s all that Congress can do in the export context.
2. Kelly and Amzel’s Criticisms of U.S. Shoe – The typical academic
commentator thinks that the taxing power is, and should be, unconstrained,
except by political forces, and that provisions like the Export Clause are
nothing but irritants. For those who believe that Congress’s taxing power is
plenary, the Export Clause gets in the way, and that’s not a good thing.206
Although their numbers are small, a few other scholars think that the
Court in U.S. Shoe left Congress with too much flexibility. In an interesting
1999 article, Claire Kelly and Daniela Amzel were highly critical of the case,
arguing that, although the Court came to the right result, it got a key part of the
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analysis wrong.207 Under the Export Clause, they concluded, Congress may not
impose any charge, including a user fee, that falls on exported articles.
Kelly and Amzel’s big point was that, by endorsing a “mythical user
fee exception,” the Court allowed the Commerce Clause potentially to trump
the  Export Clause in a way not intended by the founders.208 Because the Court
determined that the HMT was really a tax, that didn’t happen in U.S. Shoe, but
it could have. If the Court had decided that the HMT was a user fee, it would
have upheld the HMT – a result that, in Kelly and Amzel’s view, would have
been inconsistent with the dictates of the Export Clause.
In effect, Kelly and Amzel concluded that the Court had made things
too complicated: since any governmental charge on exports is forbidden, they
said, the Court should simply have asked whether the HMT was imposed on
“Articles exported” – whether, that is, it was “an exaction which: (1) arises
during the process of exportation; and (2) is calculated based upon the export
or the process of exportation.”209 If it was – and about that there could have
been little doubt – it should have been prohibited by the Export Clause.
Kelly and Amzel were half right, as I’ll now demonstrate. Congress
ought not to be able to rely on the Commerce Clause to circumvent the
limitation of the Export Clause, but the user fee “exception,” rather than being
a creation of the Commerce Clause, is implicit in the Export Clause itself.
a. Can the Commerce Clause Trump the Export Clause?
Kelly and Amzel were right that a tax or duty on exported articles is
forbidden, regardless of whether the levy might otherwise have been within
Congress’s power to regulate commerce. If the Export Clause were simply
another factor to throw on the scales – weighing the commerce power against
effects on exportation – the Export Clause wouldn’t have been so controversial
at the Constitutional Convention. But the founding discussions about the Clause
make clear that what was at stake was whether Congress could tax exports at
all.210 The Export Clause is a specific prohibition within the otherwise generally
expansive congressional power to regulate commerce.211
It’s true that, in practice, this point may not be nearly as significant as
it was in 1787. Congress can often avoid Export Clause issues by relying
directly on its regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause (powers that have
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implicit in the power to declare war. See supra note 51 (noting conclusion of some
founders that war power encompassed power to embargo goods). But see id. (discussing
whether forbidding export taxation would have precluded embargo on exports).
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hint it was relying on the Commerce Clause. Kelly and Amzel instead saw intellectual
osmosis at work, referring to the “conceptual genealogy of the user fee concept,” and
stating that, “although the Court nominally rejected direct Commerce C lause precedent,
it still utilized it by employing the mode of thinking created in the Commerce Clause
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foundation on which to build a case that the Commerce Clause controlled in U.S. Shoe.
expanded exponentially over the last two centuries). For example, suppose
Congress wishes to prohibit exports of a particular good. A confiscatory tax on
the export of the good could have a prohibitory effect, but such a tax would
face Export Clause scrutiny.212 In contrast, if Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause (or some other constitutional provision) directly to forbid
exportation of the good, no Export Clause issue would be raised.213
A prohibitory tax and direct prohibition may have the same substantive
effect, but form matters: a congressional attempt to use the taxing power to
achieve a goal otherwise permitted by the Commerce Clause would be
precluded by the Export Clause. At a minimum, the Export Clause cuts down
on the options available to Congress to affect exportation.
b. Does the Export Clause Forbid All Charges Affecting
Exports?
I agree with Kelly and Amzel that the Commerce Clause can’t trump
the Export Clause when taxation is involved, but I disagree with them about
what happened, and what should have happened, in U.S. Shoe. And I disagree
that the user fee exception blessed in that case, derived as it was from
nineteenth-century cases and constitutional text, was “mythical.”
U.S. Shoe wasn’t a triumph of the Commerce Clause over the Export
Clause – the Court didn’t speak in those terms214 – but a case in which the
Court properly struggled to determine what levies are prohibited by the Export
Clause. Kelly and Amzel argued that “[i]nvestigation into the Framers’ intent
with respect to the Export Clause reinforces that the text is the best reflection
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& Amzel, supra note 6, at 180 (citing IBM, 517 U.S. at 847-48). I  don’t think the Court
said any such thing on the cited pages – it certainly didn’t say so straightforwardly –
which may explain why Kelly and Amzel used a “see” signal to introduce the citation.
(The Court did quote the majority opinion in Fairbank to the effect that “[t]he
requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be free from any governmental
burden. The language is ‘no tax or duty.’” IBM, 517 U.S. at 848 (quoting Fairbank, 181
U.S. at 290). But the Fairbank language is hyperbole. Obviously the Constitution
doesn’t forbid the national government from imposing any burden on exportation; it
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221. 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1876); see supra notes 188-193 and  accompanying text.
of their intent,”215 and I agree. What follows from the text, however, is that if
a charge isn’t a “tax or duty,” the Export Clause isn’t implicated.216
Treating fees for goods or services as something other than taxes may
not be mandated by constitutional text, but it’s perfectly consistent with that
text. As I argued earlier, the provisions of the Constitution creating the taxing
power, and those imposing limitations on that power, simply don’t work if
interpreted to apply to fees for goods or services.217 And the use of the terms
“tax” and “duty,” when so many other configurations of terms had been used
in provisions controlling governmental levies,218 suggests that the founders
didn’t intend for all conceivable levies to be subject to the Export Clause.219
That’s what the Supreme Court had been saying for a long time.220 The
judicial conclusion that what we now call a user fee isn’t a tax or duty dates
from 1876 in the Export Clause context, and the Court in Pace v. Burgess221
purported to be interpreting constitutional text. Other nineteenth-century cases
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and infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text), a case interpreting the same statute at
issue in Pace, the Court concluded the levy wasn’t on articles in the stream of
exportation and therefore was valid even if it were a tax. But the Court explicitly didn’t
repudiate Pace: “The reasons for that decision were given at length in the report of that
case, and we see no occasion to modify the views then expressed.” Turp in, 117 U.S. at
505. And it treated the levy as a “tax” only for the sake of argument, to provide a basis
for the alternative rationale: “In the present case, the tax (if it was a tax) was laid upon
the goods before they had left the factory. T hey were not in course of exportation; they
might never be exported . .  . .” Id. at 507 (emphasis added). (For what it’s worth, I
question this alternative characterization. See infra notes 302-307 and accompanying
text.)
explicating other constitutional provisions similarly distinguished user fees
from the governmental exactions specifically referred to in the Constitution.222
To diminish the precedential value of Pace, Kelly and Amzel
reinterpreted the decision, suggesting that it wasn’t based on the taxes-fees
distinction. Instead, they suggested,
the Court in Pace found that the tax fell outside of the Export
Clause’s prohibition not because it was not a “revenue raising
exaction” under the Taxing Power or fell into some mythical
user fee exception under the Export Clause, but because the
exaction was not laid upon articles exported and bore no
relationship to those articles.223
If that’s what Pace stands for, it’s consistent with principles applied in other
cases – by its terms, the Export Clause doesn’t apply to a levy that’s not on
articles exported224 – and it’s consistent with the way Kelly and Amzel argued
that Export Clause cases should be approached.
This isn’t convincing. Perhaps Pace could have been decided using an
alternative rationale – some later cases said that might have happened225 – but
2003] The Export Clause 49
226. Pace, 92 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added).
227. But see Kelly & Amzel, supra note 6, at 163 (“The ruling in Pace did not
find a type of exaction outside the scope of ‘tax’ . . . .”).
228. I understand it’s common practice among law professors to examine a line
of cases in order to identify a unifying theme, even if the courts decid ing the cases didn’t
articulate  any such theme. (The practice has been most closely identified with the law-
and-economics movement, but it’s not exclusive to that movement.) If the goal is to
identify a rationale that can guide courts in the future, fine. A scholar might argue that
results in a line of cases are consistent with, say, economic efficiency, although the
courts didn’t discuss efficiency in their op inions, and that future courts ought to apply
an efficiency rationale explicitly. There’s nothing wrong with looking for better reasons
to justify desirable results.
But if the argument is that courts were intentionally or subliminally applying
a particular rationale while nothing like that was expressed  in the opinions, the project
rewrites history. Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 251-55 (4 th
ed., 1992) (describing “implicit economic logic of the common law”). It’s one thing to
say that Pace could  have been decided with a different rationale. (The Court said that
in Turpin  v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504 (1886); see supra note 225.) It’s quite another to say
that Pace stands for something other than what was articulated by the Court in 1876. See
also supra note 214 and accompanying text (questioning Kelly and Amzel’s proposition
that U.S. Shoe was based on Commerce Clause even though Court stated no such
rationale).
that’s not what the Court did. I find it impossible to read the short Pace opinion
and see it as standing for anything other than the distinction between a tax or
duty and a user fee. Indeed, the Court ended its opinion with the statement that
“[t]he court being of the opinion that the charge for the stamps . . . was not a
tax or duty within the meaning of the [Export] clause . . ., it is unnecessary to
examine the other questions that were discussed in the argument of the
cause.”226 Not much reason for doubt there.227 If cases are authoritative (or not),
it’s because of the reasoning actually included in the opinions, not because of
might-have-beens.228
On its face, Pace stands for the exemption of user fees from the
prohibition of the Export Clause. The exemption is quite real, not mythical,
and, since the exemption is also consistent with constitutional text, there was
no reason for the U.S. Shoe Court to reject the traditional understanding of
Pace. To implement the Export Clause, a court must determine what is a tax or
duty and what isn’t. The result in Pace, like the result in U.S. Shoe, fits the text
of the Clause perfectly well.
B. The Required Relationship Between a Tax or Duty and “Articles Exported”
Some charges may not be taxes or duties and therefore may not be
precluded by the Export Clause. In addition, not all taxes or duties that have an
arguable effect on exportation, or on exporters, are prohibited by the Export
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233. See supra Part II.A.
Clause. In this section, I discuss some of the general principles, derived from
the old cases, affecting when a tax or duty is treated as falling on articles
exported. 
As I’ve noted, when the founders considered the propriety of taxing
exports, they didn’t focus on the sorts of issues that have become relevant today
– such as whether a tax that affected the export market but that wasn’t imposed
directly on exported goods was subject to the Export Clause. I could find no
reference in founding debates to questions about how close the relationship
between a tax and the act of exporting would need to be before the tax was
prohibited. And one can tell from Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion of the
Export Clause in Marbury, quoted above,229 that one very bright person, for a
particular rhetorical purpose, focused on easy cases in explicating the scope of
the Export Clause.230
But the founders were smart men, and we shouldn’t infer from their
failure to discuss all issues at mind-numbing length that the Export Clause
should be limited to taxes and duties imposed directly on exported articles.
Such an interpretation would have made the Clause a dead letter and, although
many founders didn’t favor the Export Clause, they understood that it was
supposed to have real effect. Indeed, that’s why many opposed it.231
On the other hand, it also makes no sense to try to find Export Clause
issues in every levy that can be tangentially tied, by an imaginative lawyer, to
exportation. There need to be some principles, even if they can’t be converted
into bright-line rules, to distinguish taxes or duties that are levied “on” exported
articles from those that aren’t. In 1996, in IBM, the Court said that its “cases
have broadly exempted from federal taxation not only export goods, but also
services and activities closely related to the export process. At the same time,
we have attempted to limit the term ‘Articles exported’ to permit federal
taxation of pre-export goods and services.”232 I’ve criticized IBM at some
length,233 but I have to admit that’s a pretty good description of the state of
Export Clause jurisprudence.
The following discussion is divided into four parts. First, I explicate the
proposition that a tax of general application isn’t limited by the Export Clause.
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Second, I discuss the cases standing for the principle that some levies, although
nominally not imposed on exported goods, are so closely tied to such goods that
exempting the levies from the Export Clause would effectively eviscerate the
Clause. Third, I discuss when a good is treated as entering the stream of
exportation – the point in time after which Congress may no longer impose a
tax or duty on the good. Finally, I suggest a principle, derived from a 1923
Supreme Court case, that should be applied in doubtful situations to determine
whether a levy falls on exported articles – and, more generally, to resolve all
issues affecting the scope of the Export Clause.
1. Taxes of General Application – The cases are clear that a tax of
general application doesn’t violate the Export Clause, as long as the tax’s
connection with exportation is sufficiently attenuated. At a minimum, this
category includes a generally applicable income tax and a generally applicable
excise on pre-export goods or services.
a. Generally Applicable Income Tax
A tax that reaches the income of an exporter in exactly the same way
it reaches the income of any other taxpayer is consistent with the Export
Clause. In W. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe,234 decided in 1918, the Court held that an
exporter could be subject to a corporate income tax, which applied to the
“entire net income arising or accruing from all sources during the preceding
calendar year.”235 As imposed, the income tax had no particular connection to
exportation: “It is not laid on income from exportation because of its source, or
in a discriminative way, but just as it is laid on other income. . . . [W]hat is
taxed – the net income – is as far removed from exportation as are articles
intended for export before the exportation begins.”236
To make the point another way: liability under the corporate income tax
wasn’t attributable to exportation per se, but to the success of the enterprise
(measured by net income). And the fact and level of the tax would have been
exactly the same if none of the income had derived from exportation.
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I admit that’s not a totally satisfactory explanation as to why a
generally applicable income tax shouldn’t be constrained by the Export Clause.
We know that a tax on exported articles doesn’t become acceptable just
because it’s imposed in a nondiscriminatory way,237 and a tax that reaches the
income of a successful exporter burdens the exporter in a very real sense: he
has fewer dollars after taxes than would otherwise be the case.
But at some point, the connection with exportation isn’t close enough
to implicate the Export Clause; ultimately a qualitative judgment is required.
One reason a generally applicable income tax should be constitutionally
acceptable is that it doesn’t necessarily apply to someone engaged in exporting.
For someone who isn’t successful – someone, that is, with no net income – the
income tax doesn’t come into play at all, an indication of how tenuous the
connection is between a tax on income and the process of exportation. The
connection is there, but it’s not strong enough.
Of course we can’t say for sure what the founders would have thought
about income taxes. There was no well-developed conception of an income tax
in 1787,238 and, for that matter, there was no conception at all of corporations.
Nevertheless, we can say this much: if a generally applicable income tax were
treated as falling on exported goods – and were, as a result, considered
unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the export income of a taxpayer – then
any tax that reaches someone involved in exportation, however tangentially,
could have constitutional problems. And that result would give the Export
Clause too much effect.239 The Export Clause was intended to be a real
limitation within its sphere, but not to be the primary check on the taxing
power.
b. Generally Applicable Excise on Pre-Export Goods or
Services
The reference in W. E. Peck to “articles intended for export before the
exportation begins”240 picked up on a line of cases, discussed in more detail
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241. See infra Part III.B.3.
242. For this purpose, “manufacture” ought to be understood broadly, and not
be limited to industrial goods. For example, an excise on agricultural products imposed
while the goods are still on the farm should be treated in the same way as goods taxed
while still at the factory. However, how these principles ought to apply to federal
taxation of e-commerce – particularly to downloadable materials that aren’t
manufactured or shipped at all in traditional ways – is just beginning to be explored.
See Travis McDade, Federal Taxation of E-Commerce? The Constitution Says ‘No,’ 98
Tax Notes 1903, 1906 (2003).
243. IBM, 517 U.S. at 846. “Services” wouldn’t be covered by the Export
Clause in any event, unless the services are integrally related to, or are surrogates for,
“Articles exported.” See supra Part III.B.2.
244. It may be that the founders wouldn’t have been happy with such an
interpretation. The First Congress did provide, in 1791, for refunds of excises that were
collected on distilled spirits that were later exported, and subsequent Congresses
followed suit. See supra note 100. I’m skeptical that the actions of early Congresses
ought to be given controlling weight in constitutional interpretation, but, if there’s a case
for doing so at all, the actions of the First Congress presumably are as authoritative as
you can get. Cf. supra note 103 (discussing lesser deference to be given to  Fifth
Congress).
Nevertheless, one shouldn’t infer from any particular enactment that Congress
was exercising the full measure of its power. (Congress can always decide to do less
than what is constitutionally permitted.) Rather than evidencing the limits of
congressional power, the refund provisions may simply have reflected caution. Why
invite disputes about the legitimacy of a levy (and therefore about the legitimacy of
Congress itself) when it was possible to eliminate any arguable Export Clause claim(and
therefore any arguable claim of congressional overreaching) by providing a refund
mechanism?
245. 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886).
246. See Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886) (“goods do not cease to be
part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, . . . to taxation in the
below,241 that tried to determine the point at which goods ought to be treated as
“Articles exported.” If, for example, a tax is imposed once a good is on a ship
ready to head overseas, there’s no question: the tax is on “Articles exported,”
within the meaning of the Export Clause.
At the other extreme, a tax imposed at the time of manufacture is
generally acceptable, even if it’s known that some of the goods will eventually
be exported and even if, in fact, the tax winds up falling both on the goods that
are exported and those that aren’t.242 This was what Justice Thomas, in IBM,
referred to as “federal taxation of pre-export goods and services,”243 permissible
under the modern understanding of the Export Clause.244
The “pre-export goods” exemption from the Export Clause was first
articulated in an 1886 Supreme Court case, Turpin v. Burgess,245 which relied,
in part, on a contemporaneous case interpreting the Import-Export Clause.246
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usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for
transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation”).
247. 192 U.S. 418 (1904).
248. Id. at 427.
249. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
250. About which, more later. See infra Part III.B.4.
The Court explained the rationale for the exemption, in 1904, in Cornell v.
Coyne:247
The true construction of the constitutional provision is that no
burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation
of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are
relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest
upon all property similarly situated. The exemption attaches to
the export and not to the article before its exportation.248
At the time of manufacture a good isn’t yet an “exported article,” and Congress
may therefore impose an excise on the manufacture of widgets without
violating the Export Clause.249
As with the generally applicable income tax, there’s a connection with
exportation at an abstract level: under the Supreme Court’s understanding, a
good that is ultimately exported may, despite the Export Clause, be subject to
taxation. But if a tax or duty is to be prohibited, the Export Clause requires a
closer, more concrete relationship between levy and exported good than results
from the mere possibility of future exportation. The line between permissible
and impermissible levies may not be bright – Not again! I hear you say250 – but
it’s a boundary that must be policed as best we can.
In any event, the difficult cases that inevitably arise at the margin
shouldn’t hide the basic principle at work here: if a tax is imposed at the time
of manufacture and isn’t directed at exportation per se, there should be no
problems under the Export Clause.
c. Taxes on Exportation Disguised as Taxes of General
Application
None of this is to say, however, that an income tax or an excise on
manufactured goods is automatically safe under the Export Clause. If a tax is
targeted at exports, it ought to fail the Export Clause regardless of its other
characteristics. For example, if an excise on manufacturing applied only to
goods that were to be exported, even though in form it might appear to be a
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251. For example, suppose a tax is imposed, in a facia lly neutral way, on a
category of goods that is manufactured solely, or primarily, for exportation.
A bit later I discuss whether a tax is valid if it’s imposed while goods remain
at the place of manufacture but some of the goods have already been designated for
exportation. See infra notes 302-307 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty
remaining after Turpin  v. Burgess).
252. I question whether a tax that reaches only a small part of the nation’s
income-earners would constitute a “tax on incomes” within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment, and would therefore be exempt from the apportionment requirement that
otherwise applies to direct taxes. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 8, at 2410-11.
For present purposes, however, I’ll put that question aside.
253. Presumably the same result should apply if the tax fell disproportionately
on exporters for other reasons—for example, if exporters were denied business
deductions that were available to other taxpayers.
254. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827 ). Brown was an Import-Export Clause
case, and the discussion of the occupational tax under the Export Clause is technically
dictum, but Marshall thought the Export Clause  and the Import-Export Clause should
be interpreted consistently. See supra note 131 and  accompanying text.
255. See supra note 12 and  accompanying text.
256. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 445. Justice Story also took for granted that
such an occupational tax would be invalid: “The prohibition extends no t only to exports,
but to the exporter. Congress can no  more rightfully tax the one, than the  other.”  Story,
supra note 33, § 1012, at 471. I’m not sure, but I think both Marshall and Story were
concerned about a tax on the person in his capacity as exporter or importer, and that they
wouldn’t have thought a tax was unconstitutional simply because it wound up reaching
someone who was an exporter. Neither jurist would necessarily have been bothered by
neutral, pre-exportation tax, it should be invalid.251 An excise would also be
flawed if the rate applicable to exported goods were higher than for other
articles. As is generally true in American tax law, substance ought to control
in characterizing a levy under the Export Clause.
Similarly, if a tax applied to the income of exporters only, and not to
that of other business persons252 – or if income from exportation were taxed at
a higher rate than other income – a court should see the tax as burdening
exportation and hence as falling on “Articles exported.”253 Such a tax would be
like a levy hypothesized in 1827 by Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v.
Maryland.254
Marshall’s examples of export taxation in Marbury were ridiculously
simple, and therefore noncontroversial,255 but, in Brown, Marshall showed a
sophisticated sense of substance-over-form in discussing a hypothetical
occupational tax that would fall only on exporters: “Would government be
permitted to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to evade
the prohibitions of the constitution would expose it, by saying that [the
occupational tax on exporters] was a tax on the person, not on the article, and
that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?”256 The tie between the tax
56 Florida Tax Review [Vol.6:1
the result in W. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918), finding no Export Clause
problem with a corporate income tax. See supra notes 234-236 and accompanying text;
see also 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 6 , 360 , at 1-14  (noting that Sixteenth
Amendment, permitting unapportioned tax on income “from whatever source derived ,”
was irrelevant to Export Clause question).
257. See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527; supra  Part II.A.2
(discussing 1797 Act).
258. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
259. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, 30  Stat. 448, 459. 
260. Id., 30 Stat. at 459.
261. See Part II.A.3. And still another in United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1
(1915). See infra  notes 271-281 and accompanying text.
and any particular exported good might be minimal with such an occupational
tax, but the link between the tax and exportation would be so strong that the tax
should fall.
2. Taxes on Goods and Services Related to Exportation – Justice
Marshall’s dictum in Brown was an early indication that courts ought to apply
substance-over-form principles to determine whether a tax or duty is on articles
exported. As I’ve just argued, one case in which such principles must apply,
unless the Export Clause is to be a nullity, is when Congress imposes a tax on
an unquestioned surrogate for “Articles exported.” But it’s also appropriate to
see some services, what I’ll call “integrally related services,” as so closely
intertwined with exported goods that a tax on the services ought to be treated
as a tax on the goods.
a. The Slam-Dunk Cases: Taxes on Surrogates for Exported
Goods
To my mind, there’s little doubt that the Export Clause should prevent
Congress from imposing taxes on clear surrogates for exported goods, such as
bills of lading. Nevertheless, Congress did just that several times, beginning in
1797,257 and the legitimacy of such a tax wasn’t tested until 1901, in Fairbank
v. United States.258
The Court in Fairbank evaluated the constitutional legitimacy of a
stamp tax, imposed at a rate of ten cents, that applied to, among other things,
“[b]ills of lading . . . for any goods, merchandise, or effects, to be exported
from a port or place in the United States to any foreign port or place.”259 (Bills
of lading for domestic shipping were subject to only a one cent tax.260) The
provision was part of the same 1898 act to raise funds for the Spanish-
American War that created another Export Clause issue in Thames & Mersey.261
The amount of the tax wasn’t measured by the value of the goods
shipped, but nothing in the Export Clause limits its scope to taxes or duties
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262. See supra notes 141-144 and  148 and accompanying text (discussing how
IBM Court could have approved  the 1915 result in Thames v. Mersey).
263. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 294.
264. Chief Justice Roger Taney had made a similar point in Almy v. California ,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1860), a case interpreting the Import-Export Clause:
[A] tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in form from a
duty on the article shipped is in substance the same thing; for a bill of
lading, or some written instrument of the same import, is necessarily
always associated with every shipment of articles of commerce from
the ports of one country to those of another.
Id. at 174. The California duty at issue in Almy was on bills of lading associated with the
transfer of gold and silver out of California, and the legislative purpose was c learly to
tax the transfer of the gold and silver itself. “The duty is imposed only upon bills of
lading of gold and silver, and not upon articles of any other descrip tion. . . . If it was
intended merely as a stamp duty on a particular description of paper, the bill of lading
of any other cargo is in the same form . . . .” Id. at 174-75.
265. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 315 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
266. See supra Part II.A.2.
measured by value.262 The Court looked to the tax’s effect – “a stamp duty on
a bill of lading is in effect a duty on the article transported”263 – and came to the
obvious conclusion: Congress couldn’t burden exports through a tax on
exported articles, and that’s exactly what it had done here, albeit
surreptitiously.264
Fairbank was nevertheless a controversial case, with four dissenters
accepting the government’s argument that the tax was really on the bills of
lading, which weren’t “Articles exported.” Adopting an incredibly formalistic
position, Justice Harlan wrote that “stamp duties were imposed specifically for
and in respect of the vellum, parchment or paper upon which was written or
printed a bill of lading for goods or merchandise to be exported to foreign
countries.”265 As I discussed earlier, the dissenters relied in part on the fact that
a similar levy had been imposed in 1797, inferring that the founding generation
thought such a tax was consistent with the Constitution.266 But because this
interpretation would have left the Export Clause with almost no effect, contrary
to the understanding at the Constitutional Convention, Fairbank had to be
decided the way it was.
b. Taxes on Integrally Related Services
Fairbank was (or should have been) easy. In other cases, the Court had
to consider levies that weren’t as closely tied to particular goods as was a tax
on bills of lading. In two cases in particular, the Court decided, in effect, that
if a tax reaches a service that is critical to exportation, so that one can’t
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267. See supra Part II.A.3.
268. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 26.
269. Id. at 25.
270. See supra Part II.A.3. As I argued above, the IBM Court could have
concluded not only that it wouldn’t overrule Thames & Mersey, but also that the earlier
case was rightly decided. See supra notes 135, 137-144, and 148 and accompanying
text.
271. 237 U.S. 1 (1915).
272. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 6 , 30 Stat. 448, 451, 460. Section 6 of the
Act specified that a tax be imposed on the “things mentioned and described in Schedule
A,” and Schedule A included  “charter party,” defined as a
[c]ontract or agreement for the charter of any ship, or vessel, or
steamer, or any letter, memorandum, or other writing between the
captain, master, or owner, or person acting as agent of any ship, or
vessel, or steamer, and any other person or persons, for or relating to
the charter of such ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any renewal or
transfer thereof.
30 Stat. at 460; see Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 16.
273. See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 448, § 1, 1 Stat. 527 (imposing one-dollar tax
on “any charter-party”). As the IBM dissenters noted, the 1797 Act wasn’t briefed  to the
Court in Hvoslef or Thames & Mersey. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 877 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); supra note 121.
274. For vessels of three hundred tons or less, the tax was three dollars. For
vessels of more than three hundred, but not more than six hundred, tons, the tax was five
dollars. For vessels over six hundred tons, the tax was ten dollars. 30 Stat. at 460.
275. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
realistically untangle the service from the goods, the Export Clause ought to
forbid the tax. I’d call this the “integrally related” test.
One example is Thames & Mersey, the 1915 case relied on by the Court
in IBM.267 Exporting valuable goods without insurance is almost inconceivable,
making insurance “an integral part of the exportation.”268 As a result, a tax on
insurance premiums was “so directly and closely related to the ‘process of
exporting’ that the tax is in substance a tax upon the exportation”269 – a
conclusion validated, in a backhanded way, in IBM.270
A similar analysis was applied in United States v. Hvoslef,271 a
companion case to Thames & Mersey. Like Thames & Mersey, Hvoslef
involved yet another tax imposed under the 1898 act as it applied to certain
“charter parties” – generally contracts for the lease of vessels – for carrying
cargo from the United States to foreign ports,272 and it involved yet another levy
with ties to the 1797 Act, which also included a tax on charter parties.273
The amount of tax was based on the tonnage of the vessel, not on the
value of the cargo carried,274 but nothing in the Export Clause limits its
application to taxes or duties tied to the value of exported articles.275 Instead of
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276. Perhaps I therefore should have discussed Hvoslef together with Fairbank,
rather than with Thames & Mersey. Ultimately, I think it doesn’t matter.
277. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17.
278. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
279. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 13.
280. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827); see supra notes 254-256 and
accompanying text. Brown involved state power under the Import-Export Clause, and
Marshall emphasized that the Export Clause should be interpreted so as not to  defeat its
purposes:
But, while we admit that sound principles of construction ought to
restrain all Courts from carrying the words of the prohibition beyond
the object the constitution is intended to secure; that there must be a
point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State
to tax commences; we cannot admit that this point of time is the
instant that the articles enter the country. It is, we think, obvious, that
this construction would defeat the prohibition.
imposing a tax directly on exported goods, Congress had slapped a levy on the
ships carrying the goods, or, perhaps more precisely, on the paperwork
associated with arranging for the ships.276
It’s difficult to imagine anything more “integrally related” to
exportation: “The charters were for the exportation; . . . they serve no other
purpose. A tax on these charter parties was in substance a tax on the
exportation; and a tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.”277 The tax
didn’t discriminate – the levy applied to all charter parties, whether or not the
ships went to other countries – but the Export Clause is an absolute
prohibition.278 At bottom, the Court concluded that it was necessary to reject the
tax on charter parties if the Export Clause was to be protected:
 This prohibition . . . is designed to give immunity from
taxation to property that is in the actual course of such
exportation . . . . This constitutional freedom, however, plainly
involves more than mere exemption from taxes or duties which
are laid specifically upon the goods themselves. If it meant no
more than that, the obstructions to exportation which it was the
purpose to prevent could readily be set up by legislation
nominally conforming to the constitutional restriction but in
effect overriding it.279
Not surprisingly, the Court referred approvingly to Chief Justice Marshall’s
substance-over-form dictum in Brown.280
If there was any question at all in Hvoslef about the substance of the tax
on charter parties, it arose when only part of a vessel’s cargo was destined for
exportation. Even then, however, the Court decided that the Export Clause
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281. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17.
282. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
283. IBM, 517 U.S. at 846 ; see supra note 243 and  accompanying text.
284. IBM, 517 U.S. at 848  (citing Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1976); Turpin
v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504 (1886); and Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904)).
applied: “Whether the contract of carriage covers a small lot, or a partial cargo,
or an entire cargo . . . can make no constitutional difference.”281 Since the tax
was based on the vessel’s tonnage, rather than being tied to the value or weight
of the cargo, that result was hardly surprising. A tax on a vessel carrying goods
for export, or on the arrangements for the vessel, was in substance a tax on the
cargo, including the exported articles.
3. When Has a Taxed Good Entered the Stream of Exportation? –
Fairbank, Thames & Mersey, and Hvoslef considered whether taxes that didn’t
fall directly on goods nevertheless ought to be treated as reaching articles
exported. At a minimum, that should be true when the tax falls on a clear
surrogate for the goods or when the “integrally related” test is satisfied. In still
other cases, the Court had to decide whether a tax that was unquestionably on
goods ought to be treated as falling on exported goods.
That is the subject of the next portion of this article. I consider the
treatment of, in order, pre-export goods (a subject I’ve already introduced282),
goods that are unquestionably in the process of exportation, and goods that fall
between the two polar cases.
a. Pre-export Goods
Despite the Export Clause, Congress may impose a generally applicable
tax on goods, or on the manufacture of goods, even if some of the goods wind
up being exported, as long as the tax attaches before the goods have entered a
stream of commerce that is heading toward exportation. That’s what the IBM
Court called “federal taxation of pre-export goods and services,”283 or a
“nondiscriminatory pre-exportation assessment.”284
For example, an excise that applies at the time of manufacture to all
widgets, whether they’ll be exported or not, is constitutionally permissible.
Suppose identical widgets A and B are manufactured simultaneously in
Massachusetts. It turns out that A is headed for Mississippi and B for England,
but it could just as well have been the other way around. As long as the tax
applies before the fungible widgets leave the factory, the tax isn’t foreclosed
by the Export Clause; it isn’t a tax on articles exported.
And the principle is broader than that. Suppose widgets are, in general,
manufactured for use both inside and outside the United States, but a particular
manufacturer produces widgets only for exportation. An excise applied to those
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285. 192 U.S. 418 (1904).
286. Act of June 6, 1896, ch. 337, § 9, 29 Stat. 253 . “Filled cheese” was “[a]ll
substances made of milk or skimmed milk, with the admixture of butter, animal oils or
fats, vegetable or any other oils, or compounds foreign to such milk, and  made in
imitation or semblance of cheese.” Id., § 2, at 253. Yum.
287. The act also  subjected imported filled cheese to a substantial duty. Id., §
11, at 255. Congress was trying to encourage the domestic cheese industry. Cornell, 192
U.S. at 427.
288. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427 . Because the Import-Export Clause generally
precludes states from imposing duties on exports, a contrary result might have led to the
conclusion that a state “government was bound to refund all prior taxes imposed on
articles exported. A farmer may raise cattle with the purpose of exportation, and in fact
export them. Can it be that he is entitled to a return of all property taxes which have
been cast upon those cattle?” Id. The question was, of course, rhetorical.
289. Id.
290. 117 U.S. 504 (1886).
291. 92 U.S. 372 (1876).
292. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
293. See Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 74, 15 Stat. 125, 157.
294. See Act of Aug. 8, 1882, ch. 473, 22 Stat. 372.
to-be-exported widgets would be permissible so long as it applied to all
manufacturers of the widgets – those who export everything they produce,
those who don’t export at all, and those who export only some of their product.
This principle is illustrated by Cornell v. Coyne,285 decided in 1904, in
which the Court, over two dissents, held that a one cent per pound
manufacturing tax on filled cheese could be imposed on all such ersatz
cheese,286 including stuff to be exported.287 The tax had nothing specifically to
do with exporting: “Subjecting filled cheese manufactured for the purpose of
export is casting no tax or duty on articles exported, but is only a tax or duty on
the manufacturing of articles in order to prepare them for export.”288 Just
because they’re exported later, articles aren’t “relieved from the prior ordinary
burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated. The
exemption attaches to the export and not to the article before its exportation.”289
The result in Cornell followed the stated rationale of Turpin v.
Burgess,290 decided in 1886. In Turpin, the Court reaffirmed the result in Pace
v. Burgess291 – the 1876 case that first analyzed user fees under the Export
Clause292 – but also added an alternative justification for Pace’s result.
The statute in Turpin was precisely the same one involved in Pace: it
imposed a stamp levy on tobacco marked for export at a lower rate than would
otherwise have applied.293 Turpin was decided just ten years after Pace, and it
appears that the Court decided to hear the new case only because, in the
meantime, Congress had repealed the levy.294 Maybe, it was argued, the repeal
showed that Congress had conceded the stamp charge’s constitutional
problems.
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295. The repeal wasn’t “a concession by Congress that the charge for the stamp
was an export tax,” said the Court, Turpin, 117 U.S. at 505, or, even if the repeal were
interpreted that way, “it would only be the opinion of one Congress opposed to that of
another.”Id. at 506.
296. Maybe the Court felt that, if it provided enough reasons for valid ity,
people would decide that it was pointless to keep asking the Court to deal with boring
Export Clause issues.
297. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507.
298. Id.
299. See supra note 225.
300. Turp in, 117 U.S. at 507.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
303. Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 74, 15 Stat. 125, 157.
The Court didn’t buy the concession argument,295 however, and that
might have ended the dispute. Once it decided that repeal didn’t affect how the
statute should be interpreted, the Court could simply have reaffirmed its
analysis in Pace. For reasons that aren’t clear, however, it didn’t do that.
Instead, without repudiating the reasoning in Pace, the Court added a new
justification for the result.296 The stamp tax, it said, wasn’t imposed “by reason
or because of [the goods’] exportation or intended exportation, or whilst they
are being exported.”297 “[A] general tax, laid on all property alike, and not
levied on goods in course of exportation, nor because of their intended
exportation, is not within the constitutional prohibition.”298
Even if Pace’s stated rationale didn’t hold up – and the Court
specifically refused to say any such thing299 – the result would have been
exactly the same. The levy was valid: “In the present case, the tax (if it was a
tax) was laid upon the goods before they had left the factory. They were not in
course of exportation; they might never be exported; whether they would be or
not would depend altogether on the will of the manufacturer.”300
It’s possible to get a pretty good sense of what the Court meant about
pre-export levies in both Turpin and Cornell, but the Court left a troubling
loose end in Turpin. One of the striking things about the Court’s opinion is that
it didn’t connect with the facts. Whatever the merits of permitting a “general
tax, laid on all property alike, and not levied . . . because of [the good’s]
intended exportation,”301 that wasn’t the situation in the case. The levy at issue
in both Turpin and Pace did single out goods to be exported.302 The charge for
tobacco was generally thirty-two cents per pound, but exported tobacco was
instead required to have only a twenty-five cent stamp affixed to each
package.303 With such a differential rate structure, the total amount a producer
owed Uncle Sam couldn’t be determined until the producer had decided which
tobacco was to be exported, and which wasn’t.
2003] The Export Clause 63
304. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507.
305. Fairbank, the first strong judicial statement that lack of discrimination
against exports is irrelevant, wasn’t decided until 1901, fifteen years after Turp in. See
supra note 83.
306. Let me reemphasize, however, that the result of Turp in would have been
unchanged, even if the levy had been treated as targeting exports, so long as the levy was
a user fee, as the Court had concluded in Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876). See
supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
307. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 848.
308. See supra notes 223-228 and accompanying text.
Does Turpin therefore mean that, despite the Export Clause, a tax
directed at exported goods can be levied on goods that have been set aside for
exportation, as long as the goods are still at the factory? The language of the
opinion – not levied . . . because of [the good’s] intended exportation304 –
suggests the answer to that question is “No,” but the result of the case is
otherwise. To be sure, the charge for the stamp affixed to exported tobacco in
Pace and Turpin was lower, indeed much lower, than would otherwise have
been the case; exported goods therefore weren’t being singled out for
discriminatorily unfavorable treatment. But lack of discrimination isn’t
supposed to matter under the Export Clause: a tax on exports doesn’t become
acceptable simply because exported goods are relatively well treated. Since the
cases discussing the irrelevance of discrimination came after Turpin, however,
maybe the Turpin result depended on an understanding of the Export Clause
that was repudiated in Fairbank and other cases.305
I’m not sure, but it seems to me that a tax that applies specifically
because articles have been designated for exportation shouldn’t be treated as
on “pre-export goods” – wherever the goods are located when the tax attaches
and whether the tax on goods to be exported is less than, equal to, or greater
than any tax on other goods.306 As meritorious as Turpin’s rationale may have
been in the abstract, it shouldn’t have applied to the facts of Turpin. That said,
however, Turpin is cited these days for the proposition that a
“nondiscriminatory pre-exportation assessment” is permissible. (The Court
characterized Turpin that way in IBM.307) If Turpin is really an example of such
an assessment, then a tax that falls on goods set aside for exportation is valid,
as long as the goods haven’t “left the factory,” and, presumably, as long as the
tax rate for exported goods is no higher than for other goods.
b. In the Stream of Exportation
As Turpin and Coyne concluded (and as revisionists interpret Pace as
concluding308), Congress may tax goods at the pre-export stage without
violating the Export Clause. At the other extreme, once articles have entered the
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309. As I suggested above, there may be some doubt about a tax that is directed
at goods set aside for exportation, before they’ve left the factory, see supra notes 302-
307 and accompanying text, but that treats the exported goods no less favorably than
goods that aren’t exported.
310. But see supra notes 302-307 and  accompanying text.
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potentially taxed) cotton, tobacco, or flour is actually being exported.
314. 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
315. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 600(f), 40 Stat. 300, 316 (1917).
stream of commerce that leads inexorably to exportation, Congress may not
impose a tax on the articles. That’s what the Export Clause is all about.
For example, an excise applied only to widgets that have been set aside
for exportation would, I think, be invalid.309 An even clearer case: if the widget
is already on a ship bound for England at the time the tax attaches, no one
would doubt that the tax violates the Export Clause insofar as it applies to the
exported goods, even if all shipped widgets – those going to other countries and
those staying within the U.S. – are subject to the tax.
c. At the (Wide?) Margin: Spalding
Except in the polar cases, where a good is still at the manufacturing
stage310 or is already on a vessel headed overseas,311 determining whether a
good is an “Article exported” isn’t easy. Even if a purportedly bright-line rule
were adopted that would confine the Export Clause to cases like those in
Justice Marshall’s Marbury hypotheticals312 – a tax laid directly on flour, say
– there can still be questions about whether, or when, the flour is being
exported. If Congress is going to tax goods, or surrogates for goods, or services
integrally related to goods, there’s no way to eliminate characterization
questions of that sort.313
A. G. Spalding & Brothers v. Edwards,314 decided in 1923, the Court’s
last Export Clause case before IBM, illustrates the difficult line-drawing that
is inevitable. At issue was the constitutionality of a wartime tax imposed on
“baseball bats, . . . balls of all kinds . . . sold by the manufacturer, producer, or
importer,”315 as that tax applied to baseball equipment that would ultimately
wind up in Venezuela. A Venezuelan purchaser enlisted the efforts of a
commission merchant to acquire equipment on its behalf and have the
equipment shipped. The commission merchant did just that, arranging for
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Spalding to deliver the goods to a carrier, at which point title passed. Spalding
was paid by the commission merchant and the merchant was paid later by the
ultimate purchaser.
If the equipment had still been “in process of manufacture” at the time
the tax attached, the tax would have been valid, under the authority of Turpin316
and Cornell.317 In contrast, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, “no one would
doubt that [the bats and other equipment] were exempt after they had been
loaded upon the vessel for Venezuela and the bill of lading issued.”318
The problem was that the Spalding facts fell between those two
extremes. The tax liability was not on the manufacture, but it also wasn’t on
goods loaded for overseas shipment. The Court had to decide which of the two
polar cases the facts were closer to, and Justice Holmes concluded, with a
decided lack of certainty, “It seems to us that the facts recited are closer to the
latter than to the former side, and that the export had begun.”319
Manufacture alone wouldn’t have been treated as a “step in
exportation,”320 but this tax was on the sale of the equipment – which by itself
gets us closer to the export stage. Moreover, although baseball bats
manufactured in the U.S. weren’t ordinarily headed overseas, in this case, as
Holmes put it, “[t]he transaction from start to finish was understood and
intended by [Spalding and the commission merchant] to be for the purpose of
exporting the goods to [the Venezuelan buyer].”321 If all of that weren’t enough,
“[t]he overt act of delivering the goods to the carrier marks the point of
distinction between this case and Cornell v. Coyne [the filled-cheese case].”322
Some might see arbitrariness in this line-drawing, and Justice Holmes
admitted as much: “[W]e have to fix a point at which, in view of the purpose
of the Constitution, the export must be said to begin. As elsewhere in the law
there will be other points very near to it on the other side, so that if the
necessity of fixing one definitely is not remembered any determination may
seem arbitrary.”323 Even hard cases need to be decided, but the harder the case,
the easier it is to conclude that the case should have been decided differently.
Spalding wasn’t clear-cut, but that doesn’t mean the result was
arbitrary. Justice Holmes prescribed a way to decide difficult Export Clause
cases. His reference to the “overt act of delivering the goods to the carrier” was
coupled with a principle which justified treating that event as critical: to have
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the Export Clause come into play “at any later point would fail to give to
exports the liberal protection that hitherto they have received; of which an
example may be seen in Thames & Mersey. . . .”324
As I’ll now discuss, the idea that exported articles should be provided
“liberal protection” against the national taxing power is a useful principle to
resolve Export Clause issues generally.
4. Interpreting the Export Clause: “Liberal Protection” – I’ve been
considering the necessary relationship, if the Export Clause is to apply, between
a tax or duty and exported articles. The cases advance some reasonably
consistent principles on this point, but, if Congress is aggressive in enacting
taxes that have export implications, courts will inevitably face tough judgment
calls. For that matter, Congress also faces uncertainty in evaluating the
likelihood that a proposed tax could face a legitimate Export Clause challenge.
Because modern commentators generally see Congress’s power to enact
taxes as plenary,325 they are unlikely to take this uncertainty seriously. One who
sees few, if any, limitations on the taxing power is likely to resolve any doubt
about constitutionality in favor of a challenged (or a proposed) tax. And
resolving doubt in favor of constitutionality means, as a practical matter, that
modernists are unlikely to raise any doubts about constitutionality to begin
with.
But the Export Clause can’t just be brushed aside. When the Supreme
Court decides two cases under the Export Clause within a two-year period,326
and strikes down congressional enactments both times, the Export Clause has
a great deal more legitimacy than if it were being promoted only by some crazy
law professor.327 IBM and U.S. Shoe weren’t aberrations. (One case might have
been characterized that way; two in two years can’t be.)
The founders intended the Export Clause to be a real restriction on
what Congress can do,328 and it should be interpreted in a way that ensures it
has real effect. Moreover, that’s the way other constitutional restrictions on the
taxing power used to be interpreted,329 until modern conceptions of
congressional plenary power gained currency, and that’s the way Justice
Holmes concluded that the Export Clause should be applied in Spalding. With
the Export Clause, we’re no longer in the plenary-power era: courts after IBM
and U.S. Shoe have an obligation to police the Export Clause.
The bottom line in Spalding was this: if there’s doubt about whether a
tax falls on exported articles – if there’s uncertainty as to where, on the
2003] The Export Clause 67
330. See supra note 118.
331. There can also be difficulty in determining whether an exaction is a tax or
duty, and that issue too should be resolved, when it arises, through application of a
“liberal protection” standard. And it may be the case that downloaded electronic
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332. I don’t mean to suggest that every levy is in danger. The cases that have
dealt with taxes of general app lication, for example, and those dealing with pre-export
goods and services will protect many levies from serious constitutional challenge.
continuum between manufacture and overseas transport, a particular tax
attaches to goods – the doubt should be resolved in a way that protects the
principles of the Export Clause. That’s the liberal protection that Justice
Holmes was talking about.
A common argument today is that it’s too onerous to tell whether a levy
has suspect effects. The difficulty of determining whether a tax or duty ought
to be treated as falling on exported articles isn’t imaginary, and therefore, the
argument goes, the constitutional limitation shouldn’t be applied – except,
perhaps, in the most straightforward, noncontroversial situations. Life’s just too
short to worry about this sort of thing.
That was one of Justice Kennedy’s points in his IBM dissent. He
suggested that it was going to be a real chore, in most cases, to determine how
a tax on insurance premiums relates to exportation, and therefore courts
shouldn’t even have to try. If that reluctance leaves the Export Clause applying
to nothing but Marbury-like hypotheticals, and therefore leaves Congress with
a basically unconstrained power to burden exportation, so be it.330
That can’t be the right interpretational principle. The idea that
constitutional limitations ought to be applied only when they’re easy to apply
gives away the store. The older cases, of which Spalding is one, suggest
another, reasonable way a limitation might be applied: if there’s doubt about
whether a particular levy attaches closer to the manufacturing stage or the
transport stage, the doubt should be resolved against the levy.331 To give
“liberal protection” to the Export Clause is, in effect, to create a default rule,
and the default position is that a tax isn’t valid unless its legitimacy can be
demonstrated.332
Providing liberal protection to exported articles isn’t merely a matter
of courts getting it right in interpreting the Export Clause. For a legislator
contemplating a proposed piece of tax legislation, a similar rule should apply:
if there’s doubt about whether the Export Clause would forbid a proposed tax,
that doubt should be resolved against the proposal. If courts are going to defer
to Congress’s implicit determination that enactments are constitutional – and
that’s still likely to happen, despite IBM and U.S. Shoe – then Congress should
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legislate with a good sense of what the Constitution, including the Export
Clause, requires.
C. Is the Export Clause Really Unique?
In both IBM and U.S. Shoe, the Supreme Court discussed the Export
Clause as if it were unique.333 The Court rejected the importation of principles
from other constitutional provisions into its analysis of the Export Clause, and
it suggested, as well, that Export Clause principles should be confined to the
analysis of that provision. Among other things, the Court specifically rejected
the application of jurisprudence developed under the Import-Export Clause –
the provision restricting states’ power to tax exports334 – to disputes arising
under the Export Clause. In the strongest statement of this interpretational
posture, Justice Ginsburg wrote, in U.S. Shoe, “IBM plainly states that the
Export Clause’s simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties
distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on governmental taxing
authority.”335 And, if that weren’t clear enough, she rejected the idea that
authority “involv[ing] constitutional provisions other than the Export Clause
[should] govern” in an Export Clause dispute.”336
I’ll concede that the Export Clause speaks in a direct and relatively
unqualified way, but I’m unconvinced that the Export Clause is unique in that
regard. Of course, if by fiat the Court creates an impenetrable barrier around the
Export Clause, that’s just the way it’s going to be, at least for awhile. But it will
be difficult for the Court to maintain that position in an intellectually coherent
way. In the following discussion, I’ll suggest three respects in which the Export
Clause should not be treated as sui generis.
1. What’s a Levy “on” Exports? – The language of the Export Clause
is strong, but treating it as if it occupies its own legal universe, particularly in
determining whether a levy falls on exported goods, is a marked break with
tradition. For decades the assumption had been that the Import-Export Clause,
restricting state authority, and the Export Clause, restricting national authority,
ought to be interpreted in tandem. The Export Clause forbids a national “tax or
duty” on “articles exported”; the Import-Export Clause generally forbids state
“duties” on “exports” without congressional consent.337 In 1827, in a passage
I quoted earlier, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “[t]here is some
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diversity in language [between the Import-Export and the Export Clauses], but
none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited.”338
The term “tax or duty” is broader than “duty,”339 obviously, so that the
prohibition under the Export Clause might very well be broader than under the
Import-Export Clause,340 as the Court concluded in IBM and U.S. Shoe.341
Moreover, the Export Clause contains a direct “textual command”342 and it’s
sort of an “unqualified prohibition.”343 That’s not as clearly true with the
Import-Export Clause.344
The Export Clause is therefore arguably the stronger restriction.
Nevertheless, it should also be true that the sort of state levy on exports that
fails Import-Export Clause requirements would be prohibited to the national
government under the Export Clause. That is, at a minimum – even if we can’t
find any other connections between the two clauses – it should be possible to
glean from Import-Export Clause jurisprudence some of the state levies that, if
imposed by the national government, would fail the Export Clause because they
fall on exported articles.
I can think of no good reason for having two different bodies of law on
what is, at bottom, a single issue: when a levy is treated as falling on exported
goods. John Marshall also thought there was no good reason for such a situation
and, on confusing questions, I’m inclined to side with John Marshall. For that
matter, the post-Marshall Supreme Court said the same thing, repeatedly, when
it was hearing Export Clause cases on a regular basis. It wasn’t until 1996 and
the decision in IBM that the Court said the two provisions might reasonably be
interpreted in different ways.
How could it have happened that the Supreme Court, after not hearing
an Export Clause case in over seventy years, suddenly rejected the time-
honored understanding that the Export Clause and the Import-Export Clause
have a core of common meaning?
I have a couple of theories. One is straightforward: some of the justices
who favored treating the Export Clause as if it were sui generis might have
been uncomfortable with questioning the national taxing power. Overturning
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Thomas’s opinion for the Court suggested that Import-Export Clause cases hadn’t held
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a revenue statute was unusual enough in the late twentieth century; doing so
twice in two years was extraordinary. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in U.S. Shoe,
which stressed the unique nature of the Export Clause,345 was written by
someone who had already shown her distaste for an expansive interpretation of
the Clause in IBM.346 Cabining the Export Clause, as her opinion for the Court
in U.S. Shoe did, may have been a form of damage control.
A second, more elaborate theory is probably closer to the truth. In the
years between 1923 and 1996, the Court was deciding cases under the Import-
Export Clause and ignoring the Export Clause. The Import-Export Clause
became increasingly permissive as the Court, for whatever combination of
reasons (boredom?), became less and less willing to see state prerogatives
limited by the Export Clause. For one thing, even though the Export Clause
doesn’t say so, the Court had stated that, if a tax didn’t “relate[] to the value of
the goods, [it wasn’t] taxation upon the goods themselves.”347 And the Court
had hinted, without resolving the question directly, that a state levy was invalid
under the Import-Export Clause only if it discriminated against imports or
exports.348
At the same time, because the Court was hearing no Export Clause
cases, no one was paying attention to the fact that the rules being applied under
the Import-Export Clause were becoming far removed from what had been
traditionally understood to apply under the Export Clause.349 That result
shouldn’t be surprising. Start with two bodies of law that are governed by a
common core of principles, but then focus judicial effort on only one of the
bodies of law. At the end of the day, and certainly at the end of seventy years,
the original principles may have been stretched out of shape in the active area
of the law. Notwithstanding stare decisis, courts do make changes in doctrine
over time, and the cumulative effect of several decades worth of incremental
changes can be dramatic.
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352. Maybe the understanding of what constitutes a “user fee” should be
extended to non-tax provisions as well, see supra note 197 (citing user fee cases arising
under other provisions), but at least there should be conformity among the various taxing
clauses.
Only in 1996, when the Court revisited the Export Clause after a long
hiatus, did it become apparent that the two lines of cases were no longer
compatible. If, in the interests of conformity, the Court in 1996 had applied
modern Import-Export Clause jurisprudence, there would have been little left
of the Clause. Applying permissive rules to the interpretation of a Export
Clause that, by its terms, isn’t at all permissive simply wouldn’t have worked.
To preserve a significant role for the Export Clause, the Court had to break the
historical connection between the two clauses, or so I hypothesize.
Under the circumstances, breaking the connection between the two
clauses made sense, but Chief Justice Marshall was still right that the clauses
should be interpreted consistently. If conformity is to be reachieved, however,
the Court will need to reexamine the principles it developed under the Import-
Export Clause. When it does that, it shouldn’t resist making use of Export
Clause jurisprudence.350
2. What’s a Tax? – It’s not automatically the case that the term “tax”
and its variants have to mean the same thing throughout the Constitution, but
I would use conformity in meaning as a starting point and abandon it only if
absolutely necessary.351 Variation in the meaning of terms in a single legal
document, even (especially?) a Constitution, is something we ought to resist,
not to endorse.
Export Clause cases should therefore provide useful guidance on what
distinguishes a tax from other governmental exactions. At a minimum, I see no
reason why the understanding that a user fee isn’t a “tax or duty” under the
Export Clause, reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe, shouldn’t be
extended to the interpretation of other taxing provisions in the Constitution.352
As I’ve argued, those provisions don’t work if interpreted to include user fees,
and we don’t need a full explication of what, if anything, distinguishes a “tax”
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from the multitude of other terms used in the Constitution to distinguish
between a “tax” and a “user fee.”353
This is a distinction that matters. For example, suppose Congress
delegates to an administrative agency the power to set the fees for services
provided by the agency – such as fees for processing patent applications. And
suppose the administrative agency sets a charge that greatly exceeds any
amount that can reasonably be viewed as a fee.354
At least the amount of the excess (and maybe the whole charge) might
be recharacterized as a “tax” – the learning in U.S. Shoe as to what is, and what
isn’t, a “tax” should be relevant to that determination – and, if so, there should
be questions about the authority of an administrative agency to impose the tax.
Regardless of how broad the federal taxing power is, Congress ought not to be
able to delegate that power to an administrative agency.
3. Review of Tax Statutes Generally  – Perhaps the biggest question that
arises from the Court’s efforts to cabin Export Clause jurisprudence is this: Is
the Court’s willingness to review taxing statutes, and to direct other courts to
do the same, limited to the Export Clause? And if the answer to that question
is “Yes,” we should wonder why that should be so.
In IBM and U.S. Shoe, the Court struck down taxing statutes on
constitutional grounds, something that hadn’t happened since the 1920s.355 As
I’ve suggested, treating the Export Clause as unique may well have been
intended, by at least some justices, to leave the remainder of the congressional
taxing power generally unconstrained by judicial review.356
But why should the Court interpret the Export Clause expansively and
other limitations on the taxing power narrowly? Justice Ginsburg in U.S. Shoe
pointed to the Export Clause’s being an “unqualified prohibition” as one reason
for treating the Export Clause as different from other tax provisions in the
Constitution,357 and, in IBM, Justice Thomas noted the clear “textual command”
of the Export Clause as a distinguishing factor.358 But the Export Clause isn’t
fundamentally different, in either respect, from other limitations on the national
taxing power.
The Export Clause is “unqualified” in a way – when it applies, it’s a
command without reservations – but the Export Clause applies only to levies
on “Articles exported,” a fairly significant qualification. In any event, compare
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the Export Clause to, say, the direct-tax apportionment clauses, which
absolutely prohibit direct taxes that haven’t been apportioned on the basis of
respective state populations,359 or the Uniformity Clause, which absolutely
prohibits duties, imposts, and excises that aren’t uniform.360 In fact, the form of
the direct-tax apportionment clause in Article I, section 9 is identical to the
form used for the Export Clause: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid” versus “No Tax or Duty shall be laid.” If the Export Clause contains a
clear “textual command,” so, too, does that direct-tax clause. If Congress were
to enact an unapportioned direct tax – a national real-estate tax would be the
clearest case – or a duty on imports that wasn’t uniform, a court should be just
as willing to reject the levy as the Supreme Court was in IBM and U.S. Shoe.
Perhaps one can infer from the language in both IBM and U.S. Shoe that
the Court is unlikely to be as vigorous in enforcing other limitations on the
taxing power as it was with the Export Clause, and I can understand the
reluctance to get involved. Maybe the Export Clause is so peculiar that we
should draw no grand conclusions about the Supreme Court’s willingness to
hold taxing statutes, outside the export context, to constitutional requirements.
Maybe, but I don’t see why.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXPORT CLAUSE TODAY
The Export Clause was understood, at the time of the founding, to be
a critical limitation on the national taxing power, and Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Clause gave it great scope. But until IBM and U.S. Shoe came
along in the 1990s, the cases that treated the Export Clause seriously were from
a period, before 1924, in which the Court was generally skeptical of the
national taxing power. One might have expected modern developments to have
reoriented the understanding of the Export Clause, just as modern developments
have led to the widespread understanding that the national taxing power is
largely unconstrained by the Constitution.
With the Export Clause, however, that didn’t happen. Neither IBM nor
U.S. Shoe rejected the old doctrines. Quite the contrary: both cases applied
interpretational principles derived from decades-old cases. The Export Clause
was revived as a limitation on the national taxing power, and the old cases
interpreting the Export Clause were revived as sources of guidance.
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Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 8, at 1059, 1090-91. In contrast, questions that arise
under the Export Clause – wha t’s a tax? when’s a good an “exported article”? – lend
themselves to judicial resolution, as more than a century of jurisprudence indicates.
One point of guidance that hasn’t received the notice it deserves comes
from Justice Holmes’s 1923 opinion in Spalding,361 striking down a tax as it
applied to exportation of baseball equipment. The dispute was a difficult one,
with case law providing no definitive means of resolution. Justice Holmes
concluded, however, that, in a doubtful situation, exports should be provided
“liberal protection” to ensure that constitutional values would be protected.362
I interpret this idea as meaning that, when the status of a taxing statute is in
doubt, the Export Clause applies.
Giving “liberal protection” for exports is a rule of interpretation for the
judiciary, but it’s also a useful guide for Congress, which should tread lightly
when imposing taxes with effects on exportation. Congress should legislate
with more sensitivity to constitutional limitations in taxation than has been the
case for several decades.
Professor Zelenak has argued that “conscientious legislators”
effectively define what constitutes income subject to the modern income tax,
and legislators shouldn’t have to worry whether every conceivable variation in
income tax policy might cause the tax as a whole not to be a “tax on incomes”
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.363 Deference to legislative
determinations is inevitable, Zelenak argued, in the income tax context.
Whatever the merits of Professor Zelenak’s position for the income
tax,364 it shouldn’t be extended to other levies. There’s no reason to defer to the
“constitutional” determinations of a legislative body that pointedly doesn’t
evaluate the constitutionality of its enactments. If we’re to defer to legislators’
views, we should, at a minimum, insist that legislators make a good faith effort
to resolve constitutional issues in the drafting process.365 A Congress that enacts
something called a “tax” which will obviously affect exportation, and does so
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without consideration of constitutional issues – exactly what happened with the
Harbor Maintenance Tax – isn’t made up of conscientious legislators.366
Of course one might argue that this is much ado about nothing; maybe
it’s time for the Export Clause simply to disappear from the Constitution. The
fears of sectional strife that gave rise to the Clause are weaker in 2003 than they
were in 1787, but, even if that weren’t true, it’s doubtful that without the Export
Clause we’d see strife reflected in discriminatory taxation of exports. And the
Clause has its embarrassing history. Although I think something like the Export
Clause would have wound up in the Constitution anyway, the Clause did have
an unfortunate connection with slavery.367
Besides, the Export Clause is a peculiarly limited protection against
abuse of the national taxing power: when it applies, it has great effect, but it
applies only within a narrow area. As sources of revenue largely unknown to
the founders have come to dominate the national taxing system – the income tax
in particular – a limitation on the national power to tax exports may seem to be
an anomaly.
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to care about the Export
Clause. First, like it or not, the Clause is in the Constitution, and it’s not going
to disappear in the near future. Second, the Supreme Court in IBM and U.S.
Shoe took the Clause seriously, which means that we have to, too. Finally, and
most important, the Court showed in those two cases that it’s now willing, at
least occasionally, to evaluate the constitutional merits of a federal revenue
statute. If the Export Clause isn’t unique in its fundamentals, and I’ve argued
that it isn’t, the long-time assumption that the judiciary will keep its collective
hands off the national revenue system may no longer be justified.
